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 ABSTRACT 
Risk Fact or Fiction: The Information Content of Risk Factor Disclosures 
by 
Maclean Gaulin 
Inconsistent with concerns of uninformative boilerplate or ‘copy and paste’ disclo- 
sure, I find that managers time their identification of new risk factors and removal 
of previously identified ones to align with the expected occurrence of future adverse 
outcomes. By using individual risk factors as the unit of disclosure, I am able to 
provide novel evidence that managers remove stale disclosures on a timely basis. After 
controlling for firm-specific heterogeneity, I find that the count of individual risk 
factors disclosed, rather than an aggregate word count, explains time-series variation 
in managerial disclosure decisions, consistent with the regulatory intent. To shed 
light on what shapes the disclosure equilibrium, I study the managerial response 
to demand ‘shocks’ from public and private enforcement actions. The results show 
that firms respond to investor demand in a manner consistent with the litigation 
shield hypothesis, and that this effect persists for multiple years. Consistent with the 
regulatory cost-benefit function, public enforcement does not result in a net increase in 
disclosed risk factors, but does evoke more definitive disclosures through more specific 
language and an increased use of numbers.
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— Chapter 1 — 
Introduction 
Do managers disclose risk factors consistent with the regulatory requirement to warn 
of future adverse outcomes ? This question is of renewed importance in light of the 
SEC’s current Disclosure Effectiveness Review which seeks to modernize and ‘improve 
the [disclosure] requirements for the benefit of investors and registrants.’1 Surprisingly 
however, when addressing the informativeness of risk factors, academic literature has 
focused on neither risk factors (as the unit of disclosure) nor specific future adverse 
outcomes . Instead, the focus has been primarily on the relation between aggregate 
measure of risk disclosure (such as total word count, as opposed to individual risk 
factors) and market outcomes (e.g. beta, return volatility) in the cross section.2 These 
studies provide important evidence that high-risk firms have longer risk disclosures, but 
they provide little evidence as to whether this association describes individual firm’s 
disclosure behavior over time. Motivated in part by the SEC’s review of disclosure 
regulations, this study seeks to address this gap through two channels: first, by testing 
whether managers disclose risk factors in a timely fashion to warn of future adverse 
outcomes, and second, by examining how the demands for risk factors from various 
stakeholders shape the managerial disclosure decision. 
I develop two novel approaches to address the question of whether managers warn 
of future adverse outcomes. First, I develop a set of measures that track individual
1Concept release File No. S7-06-16, p.147: www.sec.gov/rules/concept/2016/33-10064.pdf 
2For example Kravet and Muslu (2013), Campbell, Chen, Dhaliwal, Lu, and Steele (2014), Nelson 
and Pritchard (2016), Bao and Datta (2014), Chiu, Guan, and Kim (2015), Israelsen (2014), or 
Filzen, McBrayer, and Shannon (2016) among others.
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risk factors over time, allowing for direct observation of the managerial decision to 
add, maintain, and remove distinct risk factors across reporting periods. Guided 
by regulatory language and its practitioner interpretation, I focus on the individual 
risk factor as the unit of measure to capture each risk factor as a self-contained, 
unique risk. Second, for similar reasons, I test the informativeness of my measures on 
distinct adverse outcomes rather than general market risk, which presents a more clean 
identification of the relation between the time-series evolution of risk factor disclosures 
and the potential outcomes about which they are intended to warn. Together, these 
two approaches allow me to test directly whether managers, on average, add new, retain 
existing, and remove obsolete risk factor disclosures in advance of specific adverse 
events, including realized negative reporting outcomes (net loss and net operating loss) 
as well as adverse real outcomes (significant sales decline, general business lawsuits, 
and securities litigations). Inconsistent with concerns of uninformative boilerplate or 
‘copy and paste’ disclosure, my results suggest that managers time their identification 
of new risks and the removal of previously identified risks to align with the expected 
occurrence of future adverse outcomes. These results support the hypothesis that 
managers disclose risk factors in accordance with the SEC regulation that requires 
distinct risk factors addressing specific risks. 
The regulation —and court precedence regarding the use of risk factors as legal 
protection— also requires risk factors be detailed and specific. To test whether 
managers use improved descriptive precision in their disclosures to warn of future 
adverse outcomes, I measure the ‘definitiveness’ of disclosures using three proxies: 
specificity (effectively proper nouns, as used in Hope, Hu, and Lu, 2016), numeric 
intensity (percentage of numbers used, as used in Bozanic, Dietrich, and Johnson, 2015), 
and verbosity (average words per risk factor, capturing the ontology of Bloomfield,
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2008). I find that managers generally increase the level of definitiveness ahead 
of adverse outcomes, consistent with managers gaining and disclosing improved 
information as adverse events become more probable. 
My findings regarding both risk factor evolution and definitiveness are robust to 
controlling for the firm’s ex-ante risk and performance, which suggests that managers’ 
disclosure of risk factors is incrementally informative about underlying risks. I then 
compare my measures of risk factor evolution and definitiveness to previous literature 
by contrasting them with an aggregate measure of risk disclosure. I find that across 
most specifications, managers convey information through the evolution of individual 
risk factors, rather than the total length of risk factor disclosure (by word count), 
especially after controlling for average between-firm differences (using firm fixed 
effects). The greater predictive ability of my measures over total word count extends 
to market outcomes as well, specifically abnormal returns (over both short and long 
horizons). My results also suggest that previous findings regarding the role that 
risk disclosures play in reducing information asymmetry is more likely to represent 
firm-specific attributes rather than improvements stemming from risk factor disclosure 
evolving over time. These findings support the claim in this paper that treating risk 
factors as distinct units may be a more faithful representation of the information being 
conveyed by managers. 
Given this evidence that managers provide risk factor disclosures which are infor- 
mative about future adverse outcomes, I then study the demand for these disclosures 
from two salient sources: investors and regulators. Specifically, I test whether and 
how managers provide risk factor disclosure in response to direct demand evidenced 
by investor and regulator enforcement actions: private enforcement through securities 
litigation, and public enforcement through SEC comment letter process. Consistent
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with predictions that disclosure of risk factors can act as a litigation shield (Skinner 
1994, 1997; Robbins and Rothenberg, 2005), I find that firms respond to private 
enforcement by improving their risk disclosures via an increase in the number of new 
risk factors they identify. Also consistent with the large cost of securities litigation 
(Rose, 2008), I find that this penchant for increased disclosure persists for multiple 
years. Together, these results suggest that private investors’ demand for risk factors is 
in line with the regulation requiring disclosure of a plurality of distinct risk factors, but 
suggests that investors are informed by which risks managers deem ‘most significant,’ 
rather than through descriptions of those risks. In response to public enforcement 
actions however, I find that firms do not increase the total number of risk factors 
they identify, but do significantly increase the definitiveness of their risk factors. This 
suggests that the demand for risk factor disclosures from regulators is consistent with 
their abstaining from dictating which risks managers identify, but requiring those 
already identified factors to be definitive. 
My findings are important in light of the fact that risk factor disclosures have 
become an increasingly large portion of annual reports, growing from 11.3% to 16.1% 
of the length (by word count) over the past decade. This growth has raised questions 
among practitioners and academics alike as to whether the increase in disclosure is 
actually informative or merely boilerplate.3 Previous literature addressing this concern 
has typically focused on the length of risk disclosure using a word count or “bag of 
words” approach. However, to address the topical issue of whether managers disclose 
risk factors per the regulation, these previously used measures may not fully capture 
the information managers attempt to convey. If managers adhere to the regulation and
3For example SEC Chair Mary Jo White (2013), Brown and Tucker (2011), Lukomnik (2016), Dyer, 
Lang, and Stice-Lawrence (2016).
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convey the most significant factors that make the offering speculative or risky , they 
may be focusing on which risks they believe to be significant, rather than concerning 
themselves with the risk factor section in aggregate. Therefore, to the extent that the 
breadth of risks factors identified by managers improves information ‘fineness’ (e.g. 
Blackwell, 1951, D’Souza, Ramesh, and Shen, 2009, Cheng, Huang, and Li, 2016), 
the length of disclosure could be a byproduct of increased informativeness. Similarly, 
studying these disclosures in the cross section may fail to fully capture an individual 
firm’s disclosure choices because it assumes an absolute relation between risk and 
disclosure length, rather than allowing for firm specific differences. In other words, 
while finding that generally riskier firms have longer disclosures is an important first 
step, my study adds to the literature by studying a potential underlying mechanism 
through which these disclosures convey information. By demonstrating that firms 
update their disclosures in an informative fashion over time, I hope to provide valuable 
evidence to the current regulatory initiative seeking to modernize the disclosure 
framework. 
My measures are consistent with the principal outlined in Bloomfield, Nelson, and 
Soltes (2016), which suggests that researchers construct “variables [...] in a way that 
is most likely to capture the constructs specified in the theory they wish to test.” 
Given that my paper studies the information content in mandatory disclosures, I 
construct my measures in a way that faithfully represents the regulatory intent of the 
disclosure requirements. The regulation requires firms to include a discussion of the 
most significant factors that make the offering speculative or risky and that the factors 
be ‘organized logically,’ with each risk factor summarized by a caption. Therefore, 
I focus on the individual risk factor itself as the unit of disclosure. By narrowing 
the unit of measure to individual risk factors, I observe specific risks being addressed
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through time, and capture managers’ decision to add, remove, or continue to disclose 
about individual risks, thereby signaling whether they consider a given risk factor to 
be significant . By testing whether disclosing these individual risks predicts adverse 
outcomes, I find that the manager’s decision to signal that a specific risk is significant 
is timely and informative. 
The prior literature, which examines the informativeness of risk disclosures by 
largely focusing on the aggregate level, has drawn mixed conclusions. Some studies of 
voluntary risk factor disclosures find that the length of risk disclosure reflects both 
ex-ante litigation risk and ex-post market risk measures (e.g. Kravet and Muslu, 2013). 
Other findings suggest that the risk disclosure correlates with subsequent systematic 
risk only for firms facing high ex-ante litigation risk (Nelson and Pritchard, 2016). 
In 2005, the SEC required all firms to start including a risk factor section in their 
annual and quarterly reports. Studies regarding these regulated risk factors have 
also reach varied conclusions. Campbell et al. (2014) find that risk disclosures reflect 
subsequent market measures of risk, mirroring the results of Kravet and Muslu (2013). 
Other studies call into question the efficacy of regulation on the value of risk factors. 
Nelson and Pritchard (2016) and Beatty, Cheng, and Zhang (2015) both find that 
regulatory influence (mandatory disclosure and enforcement, respectively) decrease 
the association between risk disclosures and measures of the underlying risk. My 
study complements this literature by studying risk factor disclosures at the firm level, 
and suggests a potential reason for the disagreement may be that the information in 
risk factors is not reflected primarily through aggregate measures, but rather through 
the time-series evolution of individual risk factors. Additionally, by finding that 
the regulators and investors demand different dimensions of information from the
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disclosures, my results may suggest a reason for previous findings that regulatory 
impact weakens the association between disclosure length and underlying risk. 
My study contributes to the literature in two ways. First, my paper contributes to 
the growing literature on the informativeness of risk factor disclosures. While previous 
work by Nelson and Pritchard (2016) and Beatty et al. (2015) conclude that regulatory 
intervention from the SEC leads to less informative disclosures, my findings suggest 
an alternative perspective. Specifically, I find that the SEC elicits more detailed 
disclosures, both in specificity and in length of descriptions, for each risk factor. While 
one outcome of this regulatory focus may be that the length of disclosure is less 
correlated with underlying economic activity, my findings suggest that regulatory 
intervention may lead to more definitive or quantitative disclosures. Additionally, 
my results point to an interesting role that risk factor disclosures may play in the 
information milieu. Rogers and Van Buskirk (2009) find that firms provide less 
voluntary disclosure in response to securities litigation, and conclude that managers 
view voluntary disclosure as a legal liability.4 My finding that risk factor disclosures 
are expanded after litigation suggests that these mandated disclosures may serve as a 
mitigating factor for litigation risk, potentially substituting for voluntary information 
when the cost of the latter increases. 
Second, this study contributes to the developing literature on information overload 
and boilerplate disclosure. I demonstrate that managers update their disclosures in a 
timely fashion, suggesting that they are not merely ‘copy and pasting.’ Instead, my 
results suggest that firms are informatively choosing when to add, and potentially 
more importantly, when to remove information. In contrast to previous studies of
4While Naughton, Rusticus, Wang, and Yeung (2015) suggest this result may not be driven by lower 
litigation costs, my findings of increased mandatory risk factor disclosures are still in contrast to 
the reduction of voluntary disclosure.
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boilerplate disclosure, which take the position that increasing similarity over time 
connotes uninformative disclosure (e.g. Brown and Tucker, 2011; Nelson and Pritchard, 
2016; Dyer et al., 2016), my finding that the removal of disclosures is informative 
suggests that persistent disclosures may not be inherently uninformative. I also show 
that managers supply disclosure to meet information demand differentially based on 
the source of the demand. This is in line with the findings of Bird and Karolyi (2016) 
and Boone and White (2015) regarding the provision of voluntary information to meet 
institutional investor demand. Together my results suggest caution in interpreting 
the increasing length of disclosure as a sufficient signal of information overload. This 
study demonstrates that in some cases a more nuanced measure of information may 
be warranted, potentially one derived from the regulation or intent of managers.
 9 
— Chapter 2 — 
Risk Factor Disclosure Information Content 
This dissertation studies the information content of mandatory risk factor disclosures 
filed in annual reports by public firms in the United States. To shed light on the 
dimensions and timliness of the information in these disclosures, I present evidence 
on both the supply of, and the demand for risk factor disclosures. In this chapter, to 
study the supply of risk factor disclosures I investigate whether managers forecast 
adverse outcomes through their choice of disclosure timing and content. My findings 
are consistent with the hypothesis that managers compound their expectations of 
future cash flows and other real adverse events into their disclosure decisions. 
2.1 Hypothesis Development 
Previous literature has focused primarily on the decision value of risk factor disclosures 
by studying the capital market effects of risk factor disclosures in the cross section. 
However the evidence in this extant research on the informativeness of risk factor 
disclosures is mixed.1 Earlier studies on risk disclosures addressed the voluntary 
disclosure of risk factors. Using the entire 10-K report, Kravet and Muslu (2013) 
measure risk disclosure as the change in the number of sentences with at least one 
risk-related word. They find that industry-level risk-related disclosures, rather than 
their idiosyncratic variations, are correlated with stock-based risk measures and analyst 
perceptions of risk. Using a hand collected sample of disclosures from 293 firms, Nelson
1Again ‘informativeness’ in these studies is typically defined as ‘being decision useful,’ and is often 
demonstrated by correlating risk disclosure with future returns or other market risk measures.
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and Pritchard (2016) finds a similar association between the ‘unexpected’ length of risk 
disclosure and market risk measures, but only for firms facing high ex-ante litigation 
risk. They conclude that only high-risk firms have incentives to disclose meaningful 
warnings of future risk. Despite disagreeing on whether risk disclosures are informative 
generally or just conditionally so in some cross-sections, both studies do highlight that 
the length of these disclosures has increased significantly over time. 
Motivated in part by this increase in voluntary disclosure, in 2005 the SEC 
mandated that firms include a risk factor section in their annual and quarterly 
reports.2 Studies regarding this mandatory disclosure are mixed on the efficacy of 
the regulation and the informativeness of the disclosures themselves. In the high 
litigation risk firms, Nelson and Pritchard (2016) find that the association between 
the length of risk disclosure and ex-ante market risk vanishes after the regulation, 
and this weakened relation is seen in the association with ex-post market risk as 
well. They conclude that litigation risk still largely drives the informativeness of 
these disclosures, and the mandate did not fully substitute for the value of previous 
voluntary risk disclosures. Campbell et al. (2014) focus on the total number of words 
in the item 1A section (post SEC mandate) as well as author defined sub-categories 
of risk types (idiosyncratic, systematic, tax, financial, and legal risk). Unlike Nelson 
and Pritchard (2016), they find significant associations between risk factor disclosures 
and both ex-ante and ex-post measures of market risk (as well as ex-post information 
asymmetry). 
While the disparate evidence in prior research could be driven by differences in 
research method choices (for example section 2.3.3 and evidenced in Table 2.12), I 
focus on how the extant literature has measured risk disclosures themselves. Prior
2Securities Offering Reform, SEC File No. S7-38-04 p. 259: www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8591.pdf
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research has largely treated the entire risk disclosure as atomic, using the ‘size’ of the 
risk factor section as the disclosure proxy. For example, past studies have measured 
risk disclosure using: whether any disclosure is present (Filzen, 2015), change in the 
number of sentences containing risk words (Kravet and Muslu, 2013), total word count 
(Campbell et al., 2014), absolute value of the change in number of words (Brown, 
Tian, and Tucker, 2015), a key-word proportion based on risk categories chosen 
by the researchers3 (Campbell et al., 2014), a topic-based measure from a labeled 
classification model (Huang and Li, 2008), a topic-based measure from a computational 
word-clustering (Bao and Datta, 2014), and a ‘similarity’ score between disclosures 
(Nelson and Pritchard, 2016; Brown et al., 2015). Kravet and Muslu argue for their 
sentence level focus, claiming that “by using sentences instead of words, we avoid 
multiple counting of the same risk-related information” (2013, p. 1095). This last 
point is notable because it highlights that the proxy should capture the information 
purportedly being measured. 
This issue of matching proxy to construct is what Bloomfield et al. (2016) refer to 
as distillation . A key input to this distillation process is the construct the researcher 
is attempting to capture. Research in other areas of accounting have solved this 
problem by utilizing specialized and sometimes novel proxies developed in other 
literature. For example, Li (2008) studies whether the complexity of information 
affects its consumption, and uses the Gunning Fog measure of reading ease developed 
in linguistics to proxy for information complexity. Loughran and McDonald (2011) 
address the issue of measuring tone in narrative disclosures, but argue that a customized 
proxy is required due to the specialized nature of business communication. Previous
3Campbell et al. (2014) compile their word lists from non-overlapping subsets of words derived from 
the largest weightings of an LDA model.
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research on risk factors has primarily focused on aggregate risk disclosure , and selected 
proxies accordingly as outlined above. This study instead focuses on risk factors as 
defined by the regulation for two reasons: doing so provides a concrete foundation from 
which to derive measures, and because the regulation is consistent with practitioner 
guidance and court precedence (discussed below). 
The requirement to disclose risk factors is set forth in Item 503(c) of Regulation 
S-K: 
§ 229.503 (Item 503) (c) Risk factors . Where appropriate, provide 
under the caption “Risk Factors” a discussion of the most significant 
factors that make the offering speculative or risky. This discussion must 
be concise and organized logically. Do not present risks that could apply 
to any issuer or any offering. Explain how the risk affects the issuer or the 
securities being offered. Set forth each risk factor under a subcaption that 
adequately describes the risk. 
The regulation requires that managers disclose ‘the most significant factors,’ ‘organized 
logically’ with each risk factor summarized by a caption. This suggests that risk factors 
should be treated as a) distinct, and b) a signal of managers’ belief about specific 
adverse outcomes. The regulation also requires a concise explanation of the risk that 
is specific to the firm. Because of the presence of the SEC review process (discussed 
further below), firms must adhere to the verifiable portion of these requirements, or 
justify otherwise to the SEC (Bozanic et al., 2015). However, investor demand for 
information can also motivate managers to disclose per the regulation. 
Investors can potentially influence managers to disclose risk factors consistent with 
the regulation because by doing so, managers potentially can protect against securities 
litigation. This ‘litigation shield’ hypothesis (Skinner 1994, 1997) posits that warning 
investors of negative outcomes in advance can reduce the expected cost of class-action 
securities litigation. By disclosing in advance, managers can potentially reduce the
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stock impact of the ‘corrective disclosure’ and shorten the class period.4 Additionally, 
by disclosing information in a timely manner, firms can potentially refute a plaintiff’s 
claim that the firm did not adequately provide investors with information (Robbins 
and Rothenberg, 2005). However, to invoke the litigation shield, firms must disclose 
specific and detailed risk factors (consistent with the regulation). This is because the 
value of risk factors as legal protection stems from the ‘bespeaks caution’ doctrine 
and the subsequent Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). The PSLRA, 
enacted in 1995, provided a ‘safe harbor’ against legal liability when firms disclose 
forward-looking information, as long as they include cautionary language regarding 
the uncertainty of the forecasts. 
Anecdotally, firms do use risk factor disclosures to gain legal protection,5 when 
the disclosures adhere to quality standards set forth by court precedent: 
Cautionary language must be extensive and specific. A vague or blanket 
(boilerplate) disclaimer which merely warns the reader that the investment 
has risks will ordinarily be inadequate to prevent misinformation. To 
suffice, the cautionary statements must be substantive and tailored to the 
specific future projections, estimates or opinions in the prospectus which 
the plaintiffs challenge. (Inst. Investors Group v. Avaya, Inc. 564 F.3d 
242, 256; 3d Cir. 2009) 
In Slayton vs American Express (604 F.3d 758, 762; 2d Cir. 2010) the court concluded 
that the above standards were not met, stating: “the defendants’ [risk factor disclosure] 
verges on the mere boilerplate [...] Our conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the 
defendants’ cautionary language remained the same even while the problem changed.” 
This legal precedent is consistent with the regulatory requirement that risk factor
4To bring a securities litigation, plaintiffs must define both an initial misleading disclosure and a 
subsequent corrective disclosure (and demonstrate scienter among other factors). 
5See e.g. In re Convergent Technologies Security Litigation, 948 F.2d 507,515(9th Cir. 1991), In re 
Worlds of Wonder Securities Litigation, 35 F.3d 1407 (9th Cir. 1994).
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disclosures be detailed and address specific outcomes. The latter court opinion also 
suggests that to gain legal protection, firms must update their risk factor disclosures 
in a timely fashion to reflect new information. 
Together, the demand from investors and regulatory enforcement suggests that 
managers have strong incentives to disclose risk factors consistent with the regulation. 
As these disclosures potentially afford protection from both litigation and regulatory 
actions, firms may be incentivized to ‘overload’ stakeholders and disclose of every con- 
ceivable risk factor. This information overload concern is voiced by both legal opinions 
and regulators. Justice Marshall raised this concern, cautioning that “management’s 
fear of exposing itself to substantial liability may cause it simply to bury the sharehold- 
ers in an avalanche of trivial information – a result that is hardly conducive to informed 
decision-making”6 SEC Chair Mary Jo White (2013) echoed this concern, stating “I 
am raising the question here and internally at the SEC as to whether investors need 
and are optimally served by the detailed and lengthy disclosures about all of the topics 
that companies currently provide in the reports they are required to prepare and file 
with us.”” As these suggest, it is unclear ex-ante whether disclosures will convey an 
informative signal, especially one with a subjective materiality threshold such as the 
risk factor disclosures. Thus in the absence of disclosures costs, manager’s choice of 
risk factor disclosures may convey no information about the underlying probabilities 
of the adverse outcomes they address, resulting in the ‘information overload’ Chair 
White was concerned of. 
To test whether managers do disclose risk factors consistent with the regulation 
and in a timely fashion, I study two distinct dimensions through which managers 
potentially convey information. The first dimension focuses on the individual risk
6TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 448-449 (1976))
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factor as the unit of measure, and captures the evolution of each risk factor over time. 
To do so I label each risk factor a firm discloses in their annual report as belonging to 
one of three groups: new risk factors that were not present in the previous year, old 
risk factors that were present in the previous year and persist in the current year, and 
removed risk factors, that were present in the previous year but no longer included 
in the current year. This allows me to observe how many new risk factors firms are 
identifying, as well as how many firms are removing. The latter is indicative of risks 
managers deem no longer applicable to the firm, and this ability to capture managers 
disclosing information through the removal of risk factors is unique to my approach. 
The second dimension I study captures the level of specific detail firms disclose by 
measuring the specificity and succinctness. I measure specificity with two proxies that 
capture the definitiveness, or reference to specific entities and quantities. I capture 
succinctness by measuring the average number of words used in each risk factor.7 
As discussed above, the regulation suggests that risk factor disclosures be treated 
as distinct, and as signals of managers’ belief about specific adverse outcomes. Rather 
than test whether risk factor disclosures reflect these specific adverse outcomes, previ- 
ous literature primarily studies the impact of risk disclosures on general stock market 
measures to test whether risk factors provide information on firm risk in general.8 
However, a manager’s risk factor discloses are not necessarily conditioned on the 
market’s expectations. In other words, testing whether risk disclosures are associated 
with market measures demonstrates that managers provide novel information, but
7I omit stop words from these counts such as the , and , is , etc. I use the default list of English stop 
words from the NLTK Python library. 
8See, for example, Campbell et al. (2014), Nelson and Pritchard (2016), Huang and Li (2008), Hope 
et al. (2016), Kravet and Muslu (2013), Chiu et al. (2015). One very recent contrary example is 
Campbell, Cecchini, Cianci, Ehinger, and Werner (2016), who study the relation between tax-related 
risk disclosures and taxes paid. However, they still focus on aggregate disclosure (through word 
count) and the relationship between firms, omitting firm level fixed effects.
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does not address whether their disclosures warn of specific events, which is the intent 
of my study. 
Instead of focusing on general risk, I employ a novel test of informativeness by 
studying whether risk factor disclosures warn of adverse outcomes themselves. By 
studying whether risk factor disclosures forecast discrete outcomes which a manager 
can plausibly forecast, my tests provide potentially stronger inferences about the 
information contained in risk factor disclosures because the discreteness of the outcomes 
being tested mitigates the issue of reverse causality. This leads to my first set of 
hypotheses that managers provide information in risk factor disclosures to signal 
future adverse outcomes. I predict that they do so in two ways: updating which 
risks they identify, and updating the definitiveness with which they disclose the 
risks. If managers identify risks they deem ‘most significant,’ and intend to fulfill 
both regulatory requirement and investor demand, then they will add a risk factor 
outlining this risk. As the probability of an adverse outcome increases, managers will 
plausibly gain more information about the event, as well as have increased incentives 
to disclose the risk and mitigate disclosure costs associated with not warning of the 
event. Consistent with this, Heinle and Smith (2015) argue that firms receiving bad 
information will expend resources to gather more information. If managers disclose 
consistent with their private information, this will translate into managers forecasting, 
or forewarning of these adverse outcomes. Conversely, when the probability of an 
adverse outcome decreases, if managers are continually updating their risk factors 
to reflect only those ‘most significant factors,’ then they will remove factors when 
adverse outcomes are less likely. 
H1: Firms disclose more and remove fewer risk factors in advance of 
adverse economic outcomes.
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The second dimension through which I predict that managers signal future adverse 
outcomes is the level of detail provided about these events. A recent practitioner 
review of risk factor disclosures from 50 of the largest 10-K filers demonstrates a wide 
variety in the level of specificity provided by managers.9 Hope et al. (2016) study 
this heterogeneity in specificity across firms, and find that more specific risk factor 
disclosures are associated with stronger market and analyst responses, suggesting that 
writing more definitive risk factor disclosures conveys more information to investors. 
More definitive risk factors being more informative to investors is also consistent 
with court precedence requiring risk factors to be detailed in order to benefit from 
the legal protection of the ‘bespeaks caution doctrine.’10 Additionally, as discussed 
above, managers may obtain more precise information about adverse outcomes as they 
become more probable. If managers are disclosing risk factors per the regulation and 
consistent with the legal requirements, together these forces will result in an increase 
in definitiveness of the risk factor disclosures in advance of adverse outcomes. 
H2: Firms provide more definitive risk factors in advance of adverse 
economic outcomes. 
2.2 Sample Construction and Data Collection 
Risk Factor disclosures have been required in annual and quarterly disclosures under 
Item 1A since the SEC regulation took effect in 2005. My sample starts with these 
earliest filings, and extends through fiscal year 2015. I start gathering the sample from 
the Compustat database between fiscal year end 2005 and 2015 (112,402 firm years),
9Investor Responsibility Research Center Institute 2016 report (Lukomnik, 2016) 
10e.g. In re Worlds of Wonder Securities Litigation, 35 F.3d 1407 (9th Cir. 1994), Inst. Investors 
Group v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 256 (3d Cir. 2009)
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removing those firms with missing historical Central Index Key (CIK) identifiers 
(22,715 missing). I further require firm-years have non-missing total assets (10,654 
missing) and a valid match to the CRSP securities database (27,784 missing), resulting 
in a sample of 51,249 firm years. With the 9,632 unique CIKs from this sample of 
firms, I extract the list of all matching 10-K and 10-KSB filings from the EDGAR 
index available from the SEC. This results in a sample of 67,648 annual reports filed 
for fiscal year 2005 or later, from which I then attempt to extract the Item 1A Risk 
Factor section.11 
I extract the risk factor section following the methodology described in Campbell 
et al. (2014). Appendix B describes this process in detail, resulting in a final sample 
of 31,549 firm years with non-missing total assets, previous year returns from CRSP, 
and non-missing risk factors.12 The risk factors are extracted using contextual clues 
provided in the HTML document, such as bold, italic, underline, and paragraph 
demarcations. I require that each risk factor be defined by an accentuated heading 
(bold, underlined, or italic) which is isolated on its own line or located at the beginning 
of a paragraph. The practice of captioning risk factors is pervasive because it is 
required in the wording of the regulation, and is enforced by SEC reviewers through 
comment letters. I use these extracted risk factor heading to define a unique risk 
factor. 
The methodology proposed in this paper tracks risk factor evolution over time, 
using three proxies to do so: the total number of risk factors, the number of new risk
11The number of EDGAR filings I search is larger than the number of CRSP-Compustat merged 
firm years because I do not filter out firm-years with missing data. I do this to avoid unnecessarily 
dropping observations in the year-over-year comparison of risk factor statements, for example when 
a firm has a valid annual report in the previous year but no listed CRSP identifier. 
12The sample becomes 26,547 firm years when previous year non-missing risk factor disclosure is 
required for the regressions.
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factors, and the number of dropped risk factors which were included in the previous 
filing but do not appear in the current filing. To determine whether a risk factor was 
included in a previous year, I compare the risk factor heading from the text with all 
the previous year’s set of risk factors without replacement. To compare the text, I 
use the Ratcliff and Metzener Gestalt Pattern Match algorithm (RMGPM).13 The 
RMGPM is a flexible string match algorithm that allows for a parameterized amount 
of flexibility for determining if two strings are the same. It is the algorithm that is 
used in the Python language to compare source code for differences. 
To match risk factors across years, I start with the set of risk factors comprising N 
text strings in year t , sorted from longest to shortest number of letters. I then iterate 
through the N strings, comparing each to the set of M risk factors from year t-1 , also 
sorted by decreasing length. For each n of the N risk factors, I search for an exact 
match, and failing that, I iteratively reduce the parameter restricting the ‘exactness’ 
of the match. If no match is found after allowing for a minimum of 50% character 
level match, the risk factor is counted as ‘new.’ When a match is found, the matching 
string from the set of t-1 risk factors is also removed. After searching for all N risk 
factors from year t , the remaining risk factors from year t-1 are counted as ‘dropped.’ 
I measure the definitiveness of risk factors using three proxies: specificity, numeric 
intensity, and average words per risk factor. I calculate the specificity of risk factor 
disclosures using the Stanford Named Entity Recognition (NER) algorithm, similar to 
that employed in Hope et al. (2016). The NER algorithm extracts specific entities 
(proper nouns), and is intended to capture whether disclosure uses general language 
or names a specific entity or location (e.g. our competitor vs. Microsoft, our supplier 
vs. Foxconn). I use three of the seven entity categories from the pre-trained classifier
13Included in the difflib package in the Python standard library.
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provided with the algorithm: location, person, and organization.14 Unlike Hope et al. 
(2016), I omit the remaining four categories to avoid overlap with the other proxy 
of definitiveness, numeric intensity. Consistent with Brown and Tucker (2011), I 
measure numeric intensity as the percentage of words that are numeric. The numeric 
intensity is intended to capture the level of detail provided in disclosures, through 
instances of numbers, currencies, percentages, or dates. These two measures are 
included as changes to capture the aggregate difference in definitiveness of risk factors, 
including new risk factors but also changes in the definitiveness of the existing risk 
factor disclosures. To capture the brevity of the descriptions used in the risk factors, I 
include the change in average words per risk factor. This proxy is consistent with what 
Bloomfield (2008) describes as ‘ontology,’ whereby negative outcomes are difficult 
to describe and require longer, more detailed explanations. Additionally, as adverse 
events become more likely, managers potentially gather more information (Heinle and 
Smith, 2015) which could translate into more information available to disclose. 
To test whether managers warn of adverse outcomes directly, I focus on four 
outcomes: negative net income, negative operating income, sales decline (greater 
than 10% of previous year’s sales),15 and business, or non-securities, litigation. These 
outcomes are chosen to reflect significant adverse events which are ubiquitously 
negative.16 The business lawsuit data are from the CapitalIQ Key Developments 
database. I define a business lawsuit as an event in a fiscal year with event code 25,
14Using the pre-trained, seven-class classifier (Location, Person, Organization, Money, Percent, Date, 
Time from english.muc.7class.distsim.crf.ser.gz ) downloaded from nlp.stanford.edu/software/CRF- 
NER.shtml#Models 
15The results are generally robust to using a 5% threshold, with some weakening in the significance 
of the definitiveness results. 
16To the extent that these outcomes may not be conditionally negative signals, I later perform various 
robustness tests on other outcomes to provide evidence supporting the conclusion that risk factor 
disclosures are informative of future real economic outcomes.
 21 
corresponding to Litigation events. I form the variable Lawsuit Intensity as the log 
of the number of lawsuits that occur in a given fiscal year (plus one). I gather SEC 
comment letters from the Audit Analytics Comment Letter database, and classify the 
comment letter as relating to risk factors if the risk factor column in the database is 
non-empty (consistent with Brown et al., 2015). I gather securities litigation events 
from the Stanford Law School’s Securities Class Action Clearinghouse.17 The data 
gathered includes class start and end dates, as well as filing date and outcome (settled, 
dismissed, or ongoing). A firm is said to have a securities litigation event if a filing date 
occurs within the fiscal year. To differentiate them in the tables, I refer to securities 
litigation as Litigation or Securities Litigation , and business lawsuits as Lawsuit . 
Table 2.1 presents the descriptive statistics for the final sample. Table 2.2 presents 
the pairwise contemporary correlations of the main variables used in the regressions. 
Of note is the significant negative correlation between the specificity and numeric 
intensity of risk factors and the FOG score (-0.05 and -0.16 respectively). This 
suggests that these measures of definitiveness are not provided concomitantly with 
obfuscatory, more complex language. This is consistent with managers providing 
definitive disclosures to inform stakeholders. 
Figure 2.1 shows the average number of new and dropped risk factors over time. 
The significant increase in new risk factors in fiscal year 2008 corresponds to the 
financial crisis. 
The average firm in my sample has 29.5 risk factors, and adds 3.7 new risks and 
removes 2.5 obsolete risks per year. I find that younger firms (below the median firm 
age of 13 years) disclose 34.4 risk factors on average, and identify 4.4 new factors per 
year and remove 3.2 factors. Older firms (above median age) disclose significantly fewer
17Scraped from securities.stanford.edu/filings.html using code from github.com/gaulinmp/lit scrape.
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Table 2.1 : Summary Stats 
Table 2.1 reports the summary statistics for the variables used in the regressions as defined in 
Appendix ?? .
Mean Std. Dev Min 25% 50% 75% Max N
Log ( Assets )t 6.70 2.01 2.12 5.34 6.74 8.05 11.56 26,547 
Log ( M ar k et E q uity )t 6.33 1.96 1.84 4.99 6.35 7.70 10.56 26,537 
B ook − to − M ar k ett 0.73 0.90 -0.71 0.31 0.58 0.96 4.60 26,518 
N et I ncome/ATt -0.02 0.32 -1.09 -0.02 0.03 0.07 0.40 26,536 
O pr. I nc./ATt 0.02 0.28 -1.01 0.01 0.06 0.12 0.48 25,276 
S al es/ATt 0.90 0.85 0.00 0.26 0.70 1.27 4.04 26,536 
Lev er ag et 0.23 0.25 0.00 0.02 0.17 0.35 0.96 26,547 
T ang ibil ityt 0.21 0.24 0.00 0.03 0.12 0.32 0.89 25,479 
T ur nov ert 0.87 0.78 0.04 0.33 0.66 1.13 4.15 26,538 
B etat − 1 1.04 0.54 -0.10 0.69 1.05 1.40 2.31 26,547 
E xcess R et.t − 1 0.02 0.48 -0.84 -0.24 -0.04 0.19 1.92 26,547 
E x. R et. S tdt − 1 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.10 26,547 
M in. E xcess R et.t − 1 -0.12 0.09 -0.47 -0.15 -0.09 -0.06 -0.02 26,547 
E x. R et. S k ewt − 1 0.44 1.45 -3.91 -0.16 0.34 0.95 6.18 26,545 
C AR+3 day s -0.00 0.06 -0.21 -0.02 -0.00 0.02 0.21 26,375 
C AR+3 months 0.00 0.25 -0.72 -0.12 -0.00 0.11 0.86 26,382 
B id − Ask S pr eadt +1 0.75 1.57 0.02 0.07 0.16 0.58 8.40 26,386
Indicator and Negative Outome Variables
N eg ativ e N It +1 0.31 0.46 0 0 0 1 1 22,026 
N eg ativ e O per ating I nc.t +1 0.23 0.42 0 0 0 0 1 20,970 
S al es D ecl inet +1 0.21 0.41 0 0 0 0 1 22,025 
S ec. Litig ationt − 1 0.02 0.14 0 0 0 0 1 26,546 
Law suit I ntensityt − 1 0.19 0.44 0 0 0 0 2.08 26,547 
R F C ommentt − 1 0.07 0.25 0 0 0 0 1 26,224 
C omment ( Any )t − 1 0.53 0.50 0 0 1 1 1 26,223
Textual Variables
# R isk F actor st 29.52 14.05 6 19 27 37 69 26,547 
# N ew R Ft 3.67 5.03 0 1 2 5 25 26,547 
# D r opped R Ft 2.45 3.73 0 0 1 3 21 26,547 
∆# R Ft 1.22 4.56 -11 0 1 2 18 26,547 
# of W or dst 2731.17 1707.36 396 1478 2364 3570 8847 26,547 
# of S entencest 257.39 150.96 43 147 228 335 729 26,547 
# of S pecif ic W or dst 210.10 182.34 12 89 162 273 887 26,547 
# of N umer icst 58.24 47.43 3 25 46 77 225 26,547 
# of W or ds/R Ft 88.95 25.77 38.71 71.30 86.32 102.93 176.54 26,547 
S pecif icityt 5.45 3.25 0.60 3.21 4.76 6.90 17.88 26,547 
N umer ic I ntensityt 2.11 1.05 0.49 1.37 1.92 2.63 5.86 26,547 
F O G I ndext 20.68 1.23 17.64 19.91 20.69 21.45 23.89 26,547
risk factors, only 25.8, and identify new factors and remove old factors at significantly 
lower rates as well (3.4 and 2.2, respectively). This potentially suggests life cycle 
effects in risk factor disclosures, with older, more established, and less volatile firms 
disclosing fewer risks and experiencing less risk ‘turnover.’ However, when looking at
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Table 2.2 : Summary Stats: Correlation 
Table 2.2 reports the pairwise correlations for the variables used in the regressions as defined in 
Appendix ?? . Coefficients in bold are significant at the 5% level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(1) N eg ativ e N It +1 1 
(2) S al es D ecl inet +1 0.24 1 
(3) S ec. Litig ationt − 1 0.04 0.01 1 
(4) Law suit I ntensityt − 1 0.00 0.02 0.11 1 
(5) R F C ommentt − 1 -0.01 0.02 0.03 0.07 1 
(6) C omment ( Any )t − 1 -0.01 0.00 0.04 0.10 0.25 1 
(7) Log ( Assets )t -0.34 0.00 0.03 0.27 0.09 0.17 1 
(8) B ook − to − M ar k ett 0.10 0.16 -0.00 -0.05 0.03 0.01 0.07 1 
(9) N et I ncome/ATt -0.48 -0.01 -0.02 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.37 0.04 1 
(10) B etat − 1 -0.01 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.26 -0.08 0.06 
(11) E xcess R et.t − 1 -0.19 -0.16 -0.07 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.06 -0.19 0.15 
(12) E x. R et. S tdt − 1 0.41 0.16 0.06 -0.04 0.02 -0.01 -0.51 0.14 -0.44 
(13) # R isk F actor st 0.16 0.00 0.06 -0.01 0.02 0.06 -0.00 0.03 -0.17 
(14) # N ew R Ft 0.11 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.06 -0.11 
(15) # D r opped R Ft 0.10 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.05 -0.00 0.01 -0.12 
(16) Log (# of W or ds )t 0.19 -0.01 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.00 -0.22 
(17) S pecif icityt -0.04 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.13 0.08 0.03 
(18) N umer ic I ntensityt 0.08 0.06 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.07 0.06 -0.08 
(19) F O G I ndext -0.06 -0.02 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.32 0.03 0.01
Continued...
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
(11) E xcess R et.t − 1 0.04 1 
(12) E x. R et. S tdt − 1 -0.11 -0.05 1 
(13) # R isk F actor st 0.06 -0.02 0.08 1 
(14) # N ew R Ft -0.00 -0.02 0.14 0.40 1 
(15) # D r opped R Ft 0.01 -0.01 0.14 0.25 0.49 1 
(16) Log (# of W or ds )t 0.11 -0.02 0.10 0.86 0.32 0.26 1 
(17) S pecif icityt -0.05 -0.03 0.01 -0.00 0.07 0.04 0.02 1 
(18) N umer ic I ntensityt -0.02 -0.04 0.17 -0.03 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.42 1 
(19) F O G I ndext 0.05 -0.00 -0.14 0.20 0.10 0.09 0.33 -0.05 -0.16
the change in word count of the risk factors between these two groups, there is no 
significant difference.18 This suggests that the time series evolution of risk factors 
may capture some underlying economic differences that a word count approach does 
not. A graphical depiction of this trend is presented in Figure 2.2.
18The change in word counts are 135.5 and 136.4 for young and old firms respectively (t-stat = -0.16). 
The t-stat for difference in new, dropped, and total risk factors are all significant at < 0.001 level.
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Figure 2.1 : New and Removed Risk Factors Over Time 
Figure 2.1 plots the average number of new and removed risk factors by fiscal year. 
The sample comprises firm-years with a non-missing risk factor section in the previous 
year.
2.3 Results 
The first two hypotheses posit that managers will increase their identification of risk 
factors in advance of adverse events. To capture the time-series evolution of both the 
underlying economics and firm disclosure, I employ panel regressions and control for 
firm specific heterogeneity using firm fixed effects. This is in contrast to the extant 
literature, which has largely focused on risk factors in the cross-section using a pooled 
OLS approach. My measure of adverse outcomes is an indicator variable for negative 
income, negative operating income, and significant sales decline of greater than ten
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Figure 2.2 : New and Removed Risk Factors Over Firm Age 
Figure 2.2 plots the average number of new and removed risk factors over the age 
of the firm. The datapoints represent averages over five year periods. The sample 
comprises firm-years with a non-missing risk factor section in the previous year.
percent of the previous year’s sales.19 To capture general business lawsuits, I use the 
natural log of one plus the number of lawsuits brought against the firm in a given 
year. 
To address the first two hypotheses, I employ a predictive framework in which I 
regress the adverse outcomes (in the following year) on the measures of risk factor 
disclosures and test whether increases or decreases in risk factors and their definitiveness 
precede the events. To model the accounting based outcomes, which are coded as
19To avoid biasing towards small firms, I require the sales decline to be at least ten million dollars. 
Thus, firms with sales less than 100 million must experience a decrease in sales of more than ten 
million.
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dichotomous variables, I use a probit specification with correlated random effects to 
control for firm specific heterogeneity (Wooldridge, 2010). The lawsuit intensity is 
modeled using OLS with firm fixed effects.20 
Table 2.3 : Adverse Outcome Predictability 
Table 2.3 reports results from predictive regressions of future adverse outcomes on current risk factor 
disclosures. Specifications (1)–(3) present probit regressions with correlated random effects to control 
for average firm effects. Specification (4) presents an OLS regression with firm fixed effects, and the 
# of Events listed represents the number of firm years with at least one lawsuit. The coefficients in 
Specifications (1)–(3) represent the average marginal effects, evaluated at the mean of the dependent 
variables. The Sign column denotes the expected sign of the coefficients based on the hypotheses. 
The variables are defined in Appendix ?? . Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and 
absolute t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 
and 0.10 level, respectively.
Sign Negative NI Negative Op. Inc. Sales Decline Lawsuit Intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log (# N ew R F )t + 0.022∗∗∗ 0 . 014∗∗∗ 0 . 014∗∗∗ 0 . 013∗∗∗ 
(5.54) (4 . 09) (3 . 63) (3 . 58) 
Log (# D r opped R F )t – -0.024∗∗∗ − 0 . 015∗∗∗ − 0 . 008∗ − 0 . 005 
(5.62) (4 . 16) (1 . 90) (1 . 31) 
Log (# R F )t − 1 + 0.092∗∗∗ 0 . 061∗∗∗ 0 . 047∗∗∗ 0 . 044∗∗∗ 
(5.41) (3 . 75) (3 . 39) (3 . 24) 
∆ S pecif icityt + 0.001 0 . 000 − 0 . 002 0 . 004∗∗ 
(0.79) (0 . 22) (1 . 45) (2 . 12) 
∆ N umer ic I ntensityt + 0.018∗∗∗ 0 . 011∗∗∗ 0 . 014∗∗∗ − 0 . 001 
(3.69) (2 . 76) (3 . 29) (0 . 26) 
∆ Log (# of W or ds/R F )t + 0.052∗∗ 0 . 039∗∗ 0 . 059∗∗∗ 0 . 064∗∗∗ 
(2.18) (2 . 06) (2 . 83) (2 . 88)
Y ear F .E . Y Y Y Y 
C or r el ated R .E . Y Y Y 
F ir m F .E . Y 
# Observations 21,683 20,618 21,682 26,984 
# of Events 6,774 4,793 2,944 2,306
Because the hypotheses predict that managers warn of adverse outcomes, initially I 
do not include controls in the model beyond year and firm level fixed effects. Effectively, 
this tests whether managers warn of adverse outcomes, independent of expectations or 
other potential disclosure/information channels. Consistent with my first hypothesis,
20In untabulated results, I also employ Poisson model of the number of lawsuits with firm fixed 
effects, and find my results are robust to this alternative specification.
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Table 2.3 demonstrates that managers do increase the number of risk factors they 
identify in advance of adverse events. Managers are also less likely to remove old risk 
factors in advance of negative income and operating income, and marginally so for 
sales declines. On the other hand, this is consistent with managers removing risk 
factors when these adverse outcomes are less likely. The lagged total number of risk 
factors is also significant, suggesting that not only are the contemporary changes in 
risk factors predictive of adverse outcomes, but lagged increases in risk factors are 
informative as well. Taken together, this evidence supports my first hypothesis that 
managers are informatively adding and removing risk factors in a timely fashion. 
Consistent with my second hypothesis, the results in Table 2.3 suggest that 
managers disclose more definitive risk factors in advance of adverse outcomes. For 
the three accounting measure outcomes, managers increase both the frequency of 
numbers used in the disclosures and the verbosity with which they describe them. 
Because this increase in length of risk factors is concomitant with increases in the 
other measures of definitiveness (specificity or numeric intensity), it is more likely that 
the verbosity of risk factors provided are in line with Bloomfield’s (2008) ontology 
explanation rather than obfuscation. Interestingly managers do not use more numbers 
to describe the external risk of lawsuits, but they do use more specificity. This is 
consistent with managers reflecting the numerical nature of the internal accounting 
information they possess, while still providing qualitative detail about potentially less 
quantifiable external risks. 
One limitation of testing the unconditional predictive ability of risk factors is 
that managers may be merely reacting to realized adverse outcomes through ex-post 
disclosure. To address this, I further include controls for ex-ante risk as identified 
in previous studies of risk and disclosure (e.g., Campbell et al., 2014; Nelson and
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Pritchard, 2016). I also include a control for the lagged dependent variable using the 
contemporary continuous (not dichotomous) value measured at the time of the risk 
factor disclosure release, specifically: net income, operating income, and sales (scaled 
by total assets) for specifications (1)–(3), respectively, and the log number of suits for 
specification (4). 
Consistent with the unconditional results, managers disclose the new risk factors in 
advance of adverse outcomes, incrementally to what is explained by observable ex-ante 
risk.21 This suggests that managers are not merely reacting to previous adverse news 
when updating their risk factor disclosures. 
2.3.1 Alternative Specifications 
In any empirical setting, it is often important to test whether the results found are 
driven primarily by the researcher’s specification decisions. To address this concern, I 
further include tests using alternate specifications to the modeling decisions hitherto 
employed. 
Continuous Predictability 
One concern stemming from my approach to studying the predictive ability over 
extreme adverse outcomes is that these tail events may be considered too extreme 
to connote meaningfully informative disclosures. If managers do forecast adverse 
events but the typical adverse event forecast does not result in as extreme outcomes as 
those I test, my results would miss this relationship, and thereby under-estimate the 
extent of information in managers’ disclosure decisions. If, as I hypothesize, managers’
21Note the number of observations is reduced from the unconditional table due to both data availability 
of the control variables and the further omission of perfectly predicted outcomes.
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Table 2.4 : Adverse Outcome Incremental Predictability 
Table 2.4 reports results from predictive regressions of future adverse outcomes on current risk factor 
disclosures, and controls for ex-ante risk. Specifications (1)–(3) present average marginal effects from 
probit regressions with correlated random effects to control for average firm effects. Specifications (4) 
presents an OLS regression with firm fixed effects. The D ependent V ar. ( Lev el )t variable is different 
for each specification. In specification order, it is: net income / total assets, operating income / total 
assets, sales / total assets, and lawsuit intensity. The variables are defined in Appendix ?? . Robust 
standard errors are clustered at the firm level and absolute t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively.
Negative NI Negative Op. Inc. Sales Decline Log(# Suits)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log (# N ew R F )t 0 . 017∗∗∗ 0 . 009∗∗∗ 0 . 009∗∗ 0 . 012∗∗∗ 
(4 . 14) (2 . 81) (2 . 33) (3 . 13) 
Log (# D r opped R F )t − 0 . 018∗∗∗ − 0 . 011∗∗∗ − 0 . 007∗ − 0 . 005 
(4 . 14) (2 . 93) (1 . 71) (1 . 24) 
Log (# R F )t − 1 0 . 036∗∗ 0 . 018 0 . 042∗∗∗ 0 . 045∗∗∗ 
(2 . 40) (1 . 37) (3 . 01) (3 . 09) 
∆ S pecif icityt 0 . 001 0 . 001 − 0 . 002 0 . 004∗∗ 
(0 . 86) (0 . 41) (1 . 15) (2 . 29) 
∆ N umer ic I ntensityt 0 . 010∗ 0 . 006 0 . 010∗∗ − 0 . 001 
(1 . 92) (1 . 39) (2 . 31) (0 . 15) 
∆ Log (# of W or ds/R F )t 0 . 061∗∗ 0 . 042∗∗ 0 . 042∗∗ 0 . 050∗∗ 
(2 . 48) (2 . 19) (1 . 98) (2 . 25) 
D ependent V ar. ( Lev el )t − 1 − 0 . 209∗∗∗ − 0 . 113∗∗∗ 0 . 089∗∗∗ − 0 . 027∗∗ 
(5 . 60) (7 . 29) (9 . 12) (2 . 47) 
Log ( M ar k et E q uity )t 0 . 007 − 0 . 000 − 0 . 004 0 . 046∗∗∗ 
(0 . 76) (0 . 02) (0 . 64) (6 . 45) 
B ig Nt − 0 . 000 − 0 . 007 0 . 022 − 0 . 031∗ 
(0 . 02) (0 . 43) (1 . 30) (1 . 75) 
B ook − to − M ar k ett 0 . 052∗∗∗ 0 . 027∗∗∗ 0 . 011∗∗ 0 . 001 
(7 . 92) (5 . 65) (2 . 17) (0 . 25) 
T ang ibil ityt 0 . 168∗∗ 0 . 237∗∗∗ 0 . 071 0 . 132∗∗ 
(2 . 22) (4 . 03) (1 . 24) (2 . 36) 
Lev er ag et − 0 . 116∗∗∗ − 0 . 079∗∗ − 0 . 011 − 0 . 001 
(2 . 98) (2 . 50) (0 . 51) (0 . 04) 
T ur nov ert 0 . 014∗ 0 . 019∗∗∗ 0 . 032∗∗∗ 0 . 040∗∗∗ 
(1 . 89) (3 . 09) (6 . 17) (6 . 10) 
B etat − 1 0 . 002 − 0 . 004 − 0 . 007 − 0 . 005 
(0 . 25) (0 . 71) (1 . 00) (0 . 61) 
E xcess R et.t − 1 − 0 . 059∗∗∗ − 0 . 028∗∗∗ − 0 . 063∗∗∗ − 0 . 022∗∗∗ 
(8 . 60) (5 . 03) (8 . 77) (3 . 30) 
E x. R et. S tdt − 1 − 0 . 194 − 0 . 015 0 . 107 0 . 352 
(0 . 57) (0 . 06) (0 . 39) (1 . 21) 
E x. R et. S k ewt − 1 − 0 . 000 0 . 002 0 . 001 − 0 . 005∗∗ 
(0 . 11) (1 . 03) (0 . 75) (2 . 17)
Y ear F .E . Y Y Y Y 
C or r el ated R .E . Y Y Y 
F ir m F .E . Y 
# Observations 20,303 19,945 20,302 25,252 
# of Events 6,372 4,604 2,780 2,235
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disclosure decisions are driven by their subjective assessment of cash flow distributions 
(or other outcomes, such as general business litigation), it may equally reasonable to 
assume that the disclosure decision is related to the continuous underlying stochastic 
time-series economic process, rather than just discrete adverse events I primarily focus 
on. To test whether this is the case, and risk factor disclosure decisions are related 
to the continuous economic evolution of the firm, I regress continuous measures of 
accounting performance on the risk factor disclosure measures.22 The accounting 
measures I choose are (all scaled by total assets): Net Income , Operating Income , 
Sales , and ROA to capture profitability changes from either revenue declines or cost 
increases. I also control for the contemporary value of these measures, measured at 
the time of the risk factor disclosure. The results are presented in Table 2.5, and 
includes both the cross sectional predictability (using pooled OLS regressions) and 
time-series predictability (using a panel regression with fixed effects) of the risk factor 
disclosures. 
The results in Table 2.5 suggest that disclosing new risk factors is strongly correlated 
with declines in all four outcomes, consistent with expectations of risk disclosures 
containing adverse information. This relationship holds in both the cross section and 
the time series. Similarly, removing risk factor disclosures is associated with increases 
in the income measures (but not so for Sales ), and this relationship holds primarily 
in the time series, suggesting firm specific heterogeneity confounds the information 
about earnings in risk factor disclosures. There is a significant relationship between 
the Specificity of risk factor disclosures and future declines the accounting outcomes 
(and to a lesser extent the verbosity), but not so for the Numeric Intensity . One
22The sample size for these tests is larger than that of the corresponding tests in Table 2.4 because 
the latter omits observations in the presence of perfectly predicted outcomes.
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Table 2.5 : Risk Factor Disclosures and Continuous Accounting Outcomes 
Table 2.5 reports results from predictive regressions of future continuous accounting outcomes on the 
risk factor disclosure measures, and controls for ex-ante risk and accounting performance. Odd and 
even specifications correspond to cross sectional and firm fixed effects models respectively, and all 
dependent variables are scaled by total assets. Each specification includes D ependent V ar. ( Lev el )t − 1, 
which is the contemporary value of the continuous dependent variable. The results are robust to 
the omission of this variable. The variables are defined in Appendix ?? . Robust standard errors 
are clustered at the firm level and absolute t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively.
Net Incomet +1 Op. Inc.t +1 Salest +1 ROAt +1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log (# N ew R F )t -0.015∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ 
(5.89) (5.60) (4.94) (4.46) (6.57) (4.21) (5.94) (5.63) 
Log (# D r opped R F )t 0.006∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.003 0.008∗∗∗ 0.003 0.007 0.006∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 
(1.94) (4.01) (0.99) (2.59) (0.49) (0.99) (1.99) (3.93) 
Log (# R F )t − 1 -0.017∗∗∗ -0.004 -0.011∗∗∗ 0.012 -0.009 0.041 -0.016∗∗∗ -0.003 
(4.14) (0.37) (2.72) (1.09) (0.95) (1.51) (4.04) (0.29) 
∆ S pecif icityt -0.003∗∗ -0.002∗ -0.003∗∗ -0.002∗ -0.007∗∗ -0.004 -0.003∗∗ -0.002∗∗ 
(2.52) (1.85) (2.49) (1.88) (2.35) (1.51) (2.56) (1.99) 
∆ N umer ic I ntensityt -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.009 -0.006 -0.002 -0.001 
(0.63) (0.32) (0.89) (0.23) (0.99) (0.78) (0.62) (0.22) 
∆ Log (# of W or ds/R F )t -0.011 -0.029∗ -0.007 -0.018 -0.097∗∗ -0.068∗ -0.012 -0.028∗ 
(0.62) (1.83) (0.38) (1.14) (2.43) (1.89) (0.71) (1.81) 
D ependent V ar. ( Lev el )t − 1 0.514∗∗∗ 0.037∗ 0.672∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.725∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗ 0.523∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗ 
(36.07) (1.83) (60.00) (7.17) (75.10) (10.40) (36.71) (1.99) 
Log ( M ar k et E q uity )t 0.017∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 
(11.71) (6.73) (9.83) (6.51) (3.59) (2.76) (11.73) (6.87) 
B ig Nt -0.007 -0.026∗ -0.008∗ -0.026∗ 0.023∗∗ -0.003 -0.007 -0.025 
(1.30) (1.70) (1.66) (1.70) (2.11) (0.09) (1.39) (1.62) 
B ook − to − M ar k ett 0.000 -0.009∗∗ 0.002 -0.002 -0.013∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.008∗∗ 
(0.15) (2.31) (0.74) (0.51) (2.06) (3.61) (0.51) (1.98) 
T ang ibil ityt 0.031∗∗∗ -0.035 0.029∗∗∗ -0.035 0.068∗∗∗ 0.385∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ -0.035 
(3.15) (0.85) (2.95) (0.85) (3.18) (3.78) (3.22) (0.84) 
Lev er ag et -0.006 0.034 -0.024∗∗ -0.006 -0.091∗∗∗ -0.185∗∗∗ -0.008 0.025 
(0.63) (1.53) (2.53) (0.26) (3.78) (3.17) (0.89) (1.17) 
T ur nov ert -0.001 0.006 0.000 0.010∗∗ -0.016∗∗ -0.008 -0.001 0.006 
(0.50) (1.23) (0.02) (2.29) (2.57) (0.85) (0.33) (1.32) 
B etat − 1 0.007∗ 0.003 0.007∗ 0.002 0.023∗∗∗ -0.004 0.007∗ 0.004 
(1.76) (0.62) (1.88) (0.32) (2.77) (0.30) (1.87) (0.71) 
E xcess R et.t − 1 0.036∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 
(8.12) (3.72) (7.90) (3.29) (4.79) (6.46) (8.31) (3.74) 
E x. R et. S tdt − 1 -1.120∗∗∗ -0.317 -0.872∗∗∗ -0.721∗∗∗ -0.232 -0.923∗ -1.120∗∗∗ -0.346 
(5.74) (1.35) (4.63) (3.06) (0.56) (1.71) (5.79) (1.49) 
E x. R et. S k ewt − 1 -0.010∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ 
(6.27) (5.52) (5.84) (5.41) (5.10) (3.64) (6.21) (5.56)
Y ear F .E . Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
I ndustr y F .E . Y Y Y Y 
F ir m F .E . Y Y Y Y 
# Observations 25,252 25,252 25,252 25,252 25,252 25,252 25,252 25,252
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explanation may be that firms update their qualitative information across a broader 
spectrum of adverse outcomes, and provide more quantitative information in advance 
of significantly negative adverse outcomes, consistent with Heinle and Smith (2015). 
This supports the idea underlying the hypotheses that managers are making risk factor 
disclosure decisions based on their expectations of future cash flows. 
Omitting Repeated Adverse Events 
One concern of studying the predictive ability of risk factor disclosures is that managers’ 
disclosure decisions may be reacting to observed adverse outcomes, but these outcomes 
are correlated in the time series. What may appear to be predictive ability is in 
actuality an endogenous reaction to repeated adverse events. For example a firm 
suffering a net loss may contemporaneously disclose potential causes in their risk 
factor section, but if the loss persists into the next year, these risk factor disclosure 
changes may appear to ‘predict’ the loss. To mitigate this concern, I repeat the same 
predictive tests but reduce the sample of firm-year observations by omitting repeated 
observations. This effectively reduces the sample to firm years leading up to an adverse 
outcome, but does not continue to include firm years if the adverse outcomes persist. 
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 2.6. Consistent with the 
results in Table 2.4, the managers disclose more new risk factors ahead of adverse 
outcomes. Managers also decrease their removal of disclosures, which suggests they 
remove risk factor disclosures when these adverse outcomes are less likely. The 
significance of the lagged number of risk factors declines sharply, which supports the 
conclusion that risk factor disclosures have short-term predictive ability of adverse 
outcomes. This is because as adverse outcomes are repeated, the predictive risk factor 
disclosures immediately preceding the adverse outcome move into the ‘lagged’ risk
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Table 2.6 : Adverse Outcome Predictability Omitting Repeated Outcomes 
Table 2.6 reports results from predictive regressions of future adverse outcomes on current risk factor 
disclosures, and controls for ex-ante risk. The sample consists of firm-years where the contemporaneous 
value of the adverse outcome is zero. Specifications (1)-(3) present average marginal effects from 
probit regressions with correlated random effects to control for average firm effects. Specification (4) 
presents coefficients from an OLS regression with firm fixed effects. The D ependent V ar. ( Lev el )t 
variable is different for each specification, and is equal to the continuous dependent variable scaled by 
total assets. Specification (4) does not have a lagged dependent variable by definition of the removal 
of repeated adverse outcomes. The variables are defined in Appendix ?? . Robust standard errors 
are clustered at the firm level and absolute t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively.
Negative NI Negative Op. Inc. Sales Decline Log(# Suits) 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log (# N ew R F )t 0.019∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 
(4.27) (3.41) (3.18) (2.29) 
Log (# D r opped R F )t -0.016∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗ 0.000 
(3.28) (2.87) (2.47) (0.07) 
Log (# R F )t − 1 0.018 0.022∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.021 
(1.15) (1.92) (4.18) (1.61) 
∆ S pecif icityt 0.003∗ 0.001 -0.001 0.004∗∗ 
(1.82) (0.94) (0.42) (2.53) 
∆ N umer ic I ntensityt 0.003 0.004 0.009∗∗ -0.001 
(0.48) (0.89) (2.05) (0.29) 
∆ Log (# of W or ds/R F )t 0.058∗∗ 0.028∗ 0.032 0.057∗∗ 
(2.29) (1.65) (1.45) (2.56) 
D ependent V ar. ( Lev el )t − 1 -0.361∗∗∗ -0.220∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 
(5.50) (5.36) (5.77) 
Log ( M ar k et E q uity )t 0.047∗∗∗ 0.004 -0.007 0.022∗∗∗ 
(4.44) (0.64) (0.97) (3.31) 
B ig Nt 0.015 0.006 -0.000 -0.019 
(0.66) (0.38) (0.01) (1.24) 
B ook − to − M ar k ett 0.115∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.001 
(8.84) (5.44) (2.47) (0.15) 
T ang ibil ityt 0.107 0.185∗∗∗ 0.059 0.016 
(1.51) (3.75) (1.03) (0.33) 
Lev er ag et 0.011 -0.032 -0.015 0.032 
(0.31) (1.09) (0.60) (1.05) 
T ur nov ert 0.005 0.013∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 
(0.62) (2.61) (6.10) (6.26) 
B etat − 1 -0.014 -0.010∗ -0.008 -0.009 
(1.57) (1.72) (1.15) (1.30) 
E xcess R et.t − 1 -0.063∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗ -0.006 
(7.29) (5.17) (8.06) (0.91) 
E x. R et. S tdt − 1 0.939∗∗ 0.326 0.743∗∗ 0.102 
(2.18) (1.39) (2.40) (0.36) 
E x. R et. S k ewt − 1 -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.004∗∗ 
(0.37) (0.82) (0.10) (2.06)
Y ear F .E . Y Y Y Y 
C or r el ated R .E . Y Y Y 
F ir m F .E . Y 
# Observations 13,837 15,334 17,628 20,130 
# of Events 1,649 939 2,038 817
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factor disclosures, but are still predictive of the repeated outcomes. The significance 
of the definitiveness of risk factor disclosures is reduced from that in Table 2.4, but 
remains marginally significant in some cases. This suggests that firms may not exhibit 
a strong increase in the definitiveness of their disclosures immediately, but continue 
to add more detail as adverse events persist. This is again consistent with the theory 
of Heinle and Smith (2015) which suggests managers expend resources to gather more 
information when they receive bad-news signals. 
Net Change in Disclosed Risk Factors 
One potential concern of including the dual measures of new and removed risk factor 
disclosures simultaneously is that they could jointly result in no predictability of the 
net change measure. For example, in Specification (1) of Table 2.3 the coefficients for 
new and dropped risk factor disclosures have opposite signs but are very similar in 
absolute value. While Table 2.2 shows the correlation between these variables is only 
0.49, it could be the case that empirically the net combination of new and dropped 
risk factors do not predict adverse outcome. To determine whether the net change in 
disclosed risk factors predicts adverse outcomes, I combine the number of new and 
dropped risk factors in to one variable, and call this variable ∆# R F . If the results are 
mechanically driven by offsetting new and removed risk factors, then the coefficient 
on the net change should be zero. 
Table 2.7 presents these regressions with the inclusion of the control variables 
employed in Table 2.4, but the findings are robust to their exclusion. The results 
suggest that the net change in disclosed risk factors also forecast these adverse events. 
The coefficient on ∆# R F is significantly positively related to the adverse outcomes, 
suggesting that managers increase the total number of risk factors they disclose in
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Table 2.7 : Net Change in Risk Factors Predicting Adverse Outcomes 
Table 2.7 reports results from predictive regressions of future adverse outcomes on the net change 
in number of risk factor disclosures, and controls for ex-ante risk. The variable Log (∆# R F )t is 
calculated as the natural logarithm of the ∆# R F plus one, less the minimum net change in risk 
factors (-22). Specifications (1) and (2) present average marginal effects from probit regressions 
with correlated random effects to control for average firm effects. Specifications (3)–(5) present an 
OLS regression with firm fixed effects. The D ependent V ar. ( Lev el )t variable is different for each 
specification. In specification order, it is: net income / total assets, sales / total assets, lawsuit 
intensity, and the change in net income / total assets for both specifications (4) and (5). The variables 
are defined in Appendix ?? . Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and absolute 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 
0.10 level, respectively.
Negative NI Negative Op. Inc. Sales Decline Log(# Suits)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log (∆# R F )t 0 . 081∗∗∗ 0 . 035∗∗ 0 . 045∗∗∗ 0 . 041∗∗ 
(4 . 50) (2 . 43) (2 . 63) (2 . 23) 
Log (# R F )t − 1 0 . 037∗∗ 0 . 016 0 . 047∗∗∗ 0 . 047∗∗∗ 
(2 . 41) (1 . 13) (3 . 23) (3 . 22) 
∆ S pecif icityt 0 . 002 0 . 001 − 0 . 002 0 . 004∗∗ 
(1 . 03) (0 . 58) (1 . 18) (2 . 25) 
∆ N umer ic I ntensityt 0 . 010∗∗ 0 . 006 0 . 010∗∗ − 0 . 001 
(2 . 07) (1 . 57) (2 . 42) (0 . 16) 
∆ Log (# of W or ds/R F )t 0 . 059∗∗ 0 . 038∗∗ 0 . 045∗∗ 0 . 051∗∗ 
(2 . 35) (1 . 97) (2 . 04) (2 . 31) 
D ependent V ar. ( Lev el )t − 1 − 0 . 209∗∗∗ − 0 . 113∗∗∗ 0 . 090∗∗∗ − 0 . 026∗∗ 
(5 . 53) (7 . 29) (9 . 23) (2 . 44) 
Log ( M ar k et E q uity )t 0 . 007 0 . 000 − 0 . 004 0 . 046∗∗∗ 
(0 . 80) (0 . 01) (0 . 65) (6 . 45) 
B ig Nt − 0 . 000 − 0 . 006 0 . 023 − 0 . 031∗ 
(0 . 01) (0 . 38) (1 . 33) (1 . 75) 
B ook − to − M ar k ett 0 . 052∗∗∗ 0 . 027∗∗∗ 0 . 011∗∗ 0 . 001 
(7 . 88) (5 . 64) (2 . 13) (0 . 25) 
T ang ibil ityt 0 . 166∗∗ 0 . 236∗∗∗ 0 . 075 0 . 131∗∗ 
(2 . 16) (3 . 97) (1 . 31) (2 . 35) 
Lev er ag et − 0 . 115∗∗∗ − 0 . 078∗∗ − 0 . 011 0 . 000 
(2 . 94) (2 . 44) (0 . 50) (0 . 00) 
T ur nov ert 0 . 013∗ 0 . 019∗∗∗ 0 . 032∗∗∗ 0 . 040∗∗∗ 
(1 . 75) (3 . 04) (6 . 08) (6 . 15) 
B etat − 1 0 . 002 − 0 . 004 − 0 . 007 − 0 . 005 
(0 . 31) (0 . 71) (1 . 02) (0 . 61) 
E xcess R et.t − 1 − 0 . 060∗∗∗ − 0 . 028∗∗∗ − 0 . 064∗∗∗ − 0 . 022∗∗∗ 
(8 . 65) (5 . 06) (8 . 80) (3 . 31) 
E x. R et. S tdt − 1 − 0 . 204 − 0 . 020 0 . 127 0 . 376 
(0 . 59) (0 . 08) (0 . 46) (1 . 30) 
E x. R et. S k ewt − 1 − 0 . 000 0 . 002 0 . 001 − 0 . 005∗∗ 
(0 . 13) (1 . 01) (0 . 76) (2 . 17)
Y ear F .E . Y Y Y Y 
C or r el ated R .E . Y Y Y 
F ir m F .E . Y 
# Observations 20,303 19,945 20,302 25,252 
# of Events 6,372 4,604 2,780 4,534
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advance of adverse events. This supports the conclusion that my previous results of 
predictability are not mechanically driven by the dual measures decomposing the net 
change. 
2.3.2 Equity Market and Risk Factor Disclosures 
The evidence that managers appear to predict adverse outcomes supports the suppo- 
sition that managers are compounding their expectations of future economic events 
into their disclosure decisions. The evidence in Table 2.5 lend further credence to this 
conclusion. However, while this suggests that the evolution of risk factor disclosures 
contains information, it does not address whether this information is decision useful, 
i.e. whether it is informative to markets. This latter question is the primary focus of 
extant literature, as outlined above. However previous studies have generally used 
aggregated measures of risk disclosure, rather than focusing on the individual risk 
factor disclosures as the unit of observation. Ex-ante, it is unknown whether the 
dimensions developed herein to capture the information in risk factor disclosures are 
consistent with the information being compounded by the equity market. 
I therefore reconsider the model of Table 2.4 using market measures as the de- 
pendent variables. Consistent with Campbell et al. (2014), I test whether risk factor 
disclosures are associated with future market risk exposure ( Beta ), as well as short and 
longer horizon market returns to evaluate whether these risks are already compounded 
into the firm’s stock price, or whether they contain potentially novel information.23 
Similar to the approach in Campbell et al. (2014), I look at a three-day window
23I measure the market reaction using raw and idiosyncratic returns. Idiosyncratic returns are 
calculated as the cumulative abnormal returns using a Fama-French four factor model, calibrated 
using daily returns over the twelve month period starting three months prior to the filing date of 
the annual report.
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after the filing and control for the earnings news by including the change in earnings 
(scaled by total assets). For the longer horizon returns, I only calculate the abnormal 
returns for one quarter (60 business days) to avoid potential confounding inference 
from subsequent quarterly risk factor updates. 
The results in Table 2.8 suggest that in the cross section (Specification (1)), adding 
new risk factors, and the total number as well, are positively associated with a firm’s 
Beta . Removing risk factors is associated with a decrease in the firm’s Beta . This is 
an interesting result, because in the regulation for risk factor disclosures, the SEC 
requires that firms “not present risks that could apply to any issuer or any offering.” 
This suggests that firms should not discuss general risks which affect all (or some 
significant subset) firms. However it is not necessarily clear that this will preclude 
risk factors from addressing systematic risks for two reasons. The first is that it is not 
necessarily the case that managers will follow this prohibition on a systematic basis, or 
that disclosing a generic risk in a sufficiently descriptive fashion would be a violation 
of this requirement. As a result, managers may regularly disclose risk factors about 
systematic risks, which could result in an association with the firm’s raw returns. 
The second is that it is unclear whether managers have the capacity to differentiate 
between risks which are systematically priced and those which are idiosyncratic. 
In light of this potential for both the presence or absence of disclosures about 
generic, or systematic, risk, the results of Table 2.8 present an interesting juxtaposition 
to the conclusion in Campbell et al. (2014). The results show a correlation exists in the 
cross section (Specification (1)) but not so in the time-series, after controlling for firm- 
specific heterogeneity (Specification (2)). This suggests that the association between 
risk disclosure and systematic risk exposure may not be driven by the disclosure 
changes over time, but rather by idiosyncratic firm factors. However, given that the
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Table 2.8 : Risk Factor Disclosures and Market Outcomes 
Table 2.8 reports results from OLS regressions of future market outcomes on contemporary risk factor 
disclosures, and controls for ex-ante risk. Specifications (3) and (5) use raw and idiosyncratic returns, 
respectively, cumulated over a three trading day window starting on the filing date of the annual 
report. Specifications (4) and (6) use raw and idiosyncratic returns, respectively, cumulated over a 
60 trading day window starting on the filing date of the annual report. Idiosyncratic returns are 
calculated using the Fama-French four factor model described in Appendix ?? . ∆ N It is equal to 
the change in net income scaled by total assets. The variables are defined in Appendix ?? . Robust 
standard errors are clustered at the firm level and absolute t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively.
CARR aw CARI diosy ncr atic 
Betat +1 3 days 3 months 3 days 3 months
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log (# N ew R F )t 0 . 011∗∗∗ 0 . 004 − 0 . 200∗∗∗ − 0 . 557∗∗ − 0 . 176∗∗∗ − 0 . 544∗∗ 
(3 . 01) (1 . 07) (2 . 81) (2 . 26) (2 . 64) (2 . 14) 
Log (# D r opped R F )t − 0 . 015∗∗∗ − 0 . 012∗∗∗ 0 . 050 0 . 404 0 . 031 0 . 779∗∗∗ 
(3 . 73) (2 . 70) (0 . 61) (1 . 46) (0 . 40) (2 . 79) 
Log (# R F )t − 1 0 . 021∗∗∗ 0 . 023 − 0 . 208 1 . 467 − 0 . 324 1 . 379 
(3 . 34) (1 . 40) (0 . 71) (1 . 60) (1 . 24) (1 . 46) 
∆ S pecif icityt − 0 . 001 − 0 . 000 0 . 028 0 . 004 0 . 030 0 . 087 
(0 . 52) (0 . 24) (0 . 89) (0 . 04) (1 . 05) (0 . 76) 
∆ N umer ic I ntensityt − 0 . 001 − 0 . 002 − 0 . 170∗ − 0 . 210 − 0 . 137 − 0 . 175 
(0 . 11) (0 . 43) (1 . 75) (0 . 62) (1 . 51) (0 . 50) 
∆ Log (# of W or ds/R F )t 0 . 066∗∗∗ 0 . 038∗ − 0 . 999∗∗ 0 . 682 − 0 . 607 − 2 . 215 
(2 . 98) (1 . 78) (2 . 32) (0 . 42) (1 . 53) (1 . 39) 
∆ N It − 1 0 . 051∗∗ 0 . 056∗∗ 0 . 928∗∗ − 1 . 271 0 . 688∗ − 2 . 869∗ 
(2 . 13) (2 . 42) (2 . 34) (0 . 89) (1 . 81) (1 . 89) 
Log ( M ar k et E q uity )t 0 . 035∗∗∗ 0 . 093∗∗∗ − 0 . 374∗∗ − 6 . 915∗∗∗ − 0 . 499∗∗∗ − 7 . 222∗∗∗ 
(14 . 88) (9 . 44) (2 . 50) (12 . 57) (3 . 59) (12 . 20) 
B ig Nt 0 . 058∗∗∗ − 0 . 017 0 . 521 − 0 . 330 0 . 289 0 . 753 
(7 . 20) (0 . 67) (1 . 47) (0 . 23) (0 . 83) (0 . 52) 
B ook − to − M ar k ett − 0 . 007 0 . 001 0 . 197 2 . 398∗∗∗ 0 . 151 3 . 424∗∗∗ 
(1 . 49) (0 . 14) (1 . 28) (4 . 40) (1 . 05) (5 . 21) 
T ang ibil ityt 0 . 011 0 . 022 − 1 . 493 − 4 . 861 − 1 . 130 − 1 . 788 
(0 . 71) (0 . 32) (1 . 27) (1 . 10) (1 . 04) (0 . 41) 
Lev er ag et 0 . 028∗∗ 0 . 072∗∗ 0 . 656 − 3 . 345∗ 0 . 752 − 1 . 056 
(2 . 32) (2 . 13) (1 . 19) (1 . 74) (1 . 49) (0 . 54) 
T ur nov ert 0 . 056∗∗∗ 0 . 055∗∗∗ − 0 . 481∗∗∗ − 2 . 565∗∗∗ − 0 . 153 − 2 . 168∗∗∗ 
(12 . 08) (6 . 87) (3 . 74) (5 . 34) (1 . 27) (4 . 43) 
B etat − 1 0 . 618∗∗∗ 0 . 212∗∗∗ − 0 . 076 − 4 . 446∗∗∗ − 0 . 098 − 3 . 660∗∗∗ 
(98 . 11) (23 . 28) (0 . 48) (7 . 89) (0 . 65) (6 . 50) 
E xcess R et.t − 1 0 . 033∗∗∗ − 0 . 020∗∗ 0 . 015 − 2 . 188∗∗∗ − 0 . 742∗∗∗ − 19 . 251∗∗∗ 
(4 . 50) (2 . 51) (0 . 11) (4 . 39) (5 . 71) (36 . 78) 
E x. R et. S tdt − 1 4 . 385∗∗∗ 6 . 624∗∗∗ 10 . 864 192 . 267∗∗∗ − 4 . 806 − 42 . 410 
(13 . 51) (15 . 20) (1 . 50) (7 . 67) (0 . 70) (1 . 56) 
E x. R et. S k ewt − 1 − 0 . 002 0 . 000 − 0 . 011 0 . 168 − 0 . 044 − 0 . 408∗∗∗ 
(0 . 88) (0 . 03) (0 . 32) (1 . 36) (1 . 33) (3 . 22)
Y ear F .E . Y Y Y Y Y Y 
I ndustr y F .E . Y 
F ir m F .E . Y Y Y Y Y 
# Observations 19,859 19,859 23,991 23,997 23,991 23,997
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tests fail to reject a null of no association, this evidence could also be merely indicative 
of a low-power test. It does underline the potential importance of controlling for 
firm-specific heterogeneity when assessing the informativeness of disclosures which 
evolve over time. In both specifications, neither the specificity nor numeric intensity 
are associated with Beta , which suggests that managers are not disclosing more 
definitive information in advance of increased market risk exposure, with the exception 
of increased verbosity. 
The results in Specifications (3)–(6) of Table 2.8 show that adding new risk factor 
disclosures is associated with more negative returns both immediately and over longer 
periods.24 Removing risk factors is only associated with increases in returns over longer 
horizons, which potentially is due to a slow diffusion process of the news conveyed in 
(or correlated with) those removed risks managers deem no longer applicable. These 
results are consistent with those in Tables 2.3 and 2.4, that removing risk factors is an 
informative signal of future positive cash flow news (or lower risk). As expected, the 
lagged number of risk factors is not predictive of future returns, consistent with the 
market already having incorporated the information conveyed in the previous year’s 
disclosures. Interestingly, the risk factor definitiveness does not appear to inform 
market expectations, however. This suggests that managers convey their private 
information to markets by signaling which risk factors they believe to be the most 
significant , rather than through their expositional descriptions of those risks.
24In untabulated results of increasing return window lengths, the t-statistic for dropped risk factors 
increases roughly monotonically, up until approximately six months after the filing of the annual 
report, but is insignificant again at horizons of one year. The coefficient on new risk factors is 
statistically significant until six months as well, and then becomes insignificant at one year. This is 
potentially consistent with a systematic diffusion process of the information into prices, of which 
the tabulated date ranges are representative.
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These tests suggest that risk factor disclosures potentially inform, or are correlated 
with future information revelation to markets about either cash flow news (consistent 
with the evidence in Tables 2.3 and 2.4) or risk assessments (potentially driven by 
revised expected returns). It also may be the case that the divulgence of risk factor 
disclosures as public information affects the information asymmetry in capital markets, 
either by revealing novel information or confirming existing expectations. Kravet 
and Muslu (2013) refer to these possibilities as divergent and convergent outcomes, 
respectively. To test whether the measures I develop are a channel through which risk 
disclosure may affect the information asymmetry in markets, I repeat the analysis of 
Table 2.8, and study the bid-ask-spread and Amihud measure of illiquidity around the 
filing date. 
For both dependent variables, I use two alternative specifications and measures. 
The two specifications I study are cross-sectional and time series regressions, similar to 
Specifications (1) and (2) of Table 2.8, again to capture whether these informational 
effects are due to time-series disclosure variation or firm-specific heterogeneity. The 
two measures I use are the level of bid-ask-spread and illiquidity, as well as the change 
in these measures from the two weeks before the filing date. Using a change as a 
dependent variable measures the incremental effect of the new disclosures, and controls 
for temporary fluctuations in these measures over time, which if they occur before 
the filing date are unlikely to be due to the risk-factor disclosures themselves. These 
regressions are presented in Table 2.9. 
The results in Specifications (1) and (5) of Table 2.9 suggest that consistent with 
the findings regarding bid-ask-spread in Campbell et al. (2014), both the level and 
addition of new risk factors are associated with reduction in information asymmetry 
and increases liquidity in capital markets. However in the time-series, after controlling
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Table 2.9 : Market Outcomes: Bid-Ask Spread and Illiquidity 
Table 2.9 reports results from OLS regressions of market measures on risk factor measures, and 
controls of ex-ante risk. The odd specifications represent cross-sectional regressions with industry 
fixed effects, and the even specifications represent time-series regressions with firm fixed effects. The 
dependent variables in Specifications (1), (2), (5), and (6) are averaged over the ten trading days 
starting with the filing date of the 10-K. The dependent variables in the remaining specifications 
represent changes, calculated as the the average value over the ten trading days starting at the filing 
date, less the average value over the ten trading days ending the day before the filing date. Industry 
is defined using the Fama-French 12 industry classification. The variables are defined in Appendix 
?? . Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and absolute t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively.
Bid-Ask Spread ∆ Bid-Ask Spread Illiquidity ∆Illiquidity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log (# N ew R F )t − 0 . 382∗∗∗ 0 . 063 0 . 022 0 . 024 − 0 . 202∗∗∗ − 0 . 101∗ 0 . 023 − 0 . 023 
(3 . 26) (0 . 62) (0 . 49) (0 . 47) (3 . 52) (1 . 89) (0 . 78) (0 . 71) 
Log (# D r opped R F )t 0 . 251∗ 0 . 022 0 . 038 − 0 . 014 0 . 083 0 . 010 0 . 023 0 . 007 
(1 . 88) (0 . 19) (0 . 75) (0 . 24) (1 . 27) (0 . 19) (0 . 67) (0 . 19) 
Log (# R F )t − 1 − 2 . 843∗∗∗ − 0 . 623 − 0 . 019 0 . 060 − 0 . 832∗∗∗ − 0 . 487∗∗ 0 . 112∗ 0 . 055 
(9 . 49) (1 . 41) (0 . 24) (0 . 31) (6 . 45) (2 . 26) (1 . 84) (0 . 41) 
∆ S pecif icityt 0 . 096∗ 0 . 090∗∗ 0 . 012 0 . 010 0 . 046∗ 0 . 043∗ 0 . 003 − 0 . 004 
(1 . 74) (1 . 96) (0 . 51) (0 . 42) (1 . 77) (1 . 71) (0 . 19) (0 . 23) 
∆ N umer ic I ntensityt 0 . 157 0 . 147 0 . 161∗∗ 0 . 144∗ 0 . 009 − 0 . 033 0 . 024 − 0 . 033 
(0 . 90) (0 . 93) (2 . 12) (1 . 83) (0 . 08) (0 . 30) (0 . 51) (0 . 66) 
∆ Log (# of W or ds/R F )t 0 . 737 0 . 777 0 . 454 0 . 755∗∗ 0 . 286 0 . 303 0 . 117 0 . 222 
(0 . 89) (1 . 05) (1 . 41) (2 . 11) (0 . 65) (0 . 76) (0 . 56) (1 . 01) 
∆ N It /ATt − 1 − 1 . 555∗∗ − 1 . 268∗∗ − 0 . 462 − 0 . 649∗∗ − 0 . 696∗∗ − 0 . 583∗∗ − 0 . 249∗ − 0 . 180 
(2 . 51) (2 . 29) (1 . 63) (2 . 26) (2 . 31) (2 . 31) (1 . 66) (1 . 21) 
Log ( M ar k et E q uity )t − 1 . 401∗∗∗ − 2 . 971∗∗∗ 0 . 032 0 . 097 − 0 . 129∗∗∗ − 0 . 442∗∗∗ − 0 . 001 0 . 118∗ 
(16 . 87) (12 . 03) (1 . 17) (0 . 86) (2 . 93) (3 . 39) (0 . 06) (1 . 76) 
B ig Nt − 2 . 334∗∗∗ 0 . 371 0 . 119 − 0 . 071 − 0 . 516∗∗∗ 0 . 268 0 . 076 0 . 176 
(7 . 33) (0 . 60) (1 . 25) (0 . 22) (3 . 55) (0 . 94) (1 . 14) (1 . 10) 
B ook − to − M ar k ett 0 . 509∗∗ 0 . 173 − 0 . 151∗ − 0 . 116 0 . 236∗ 0 . 128 − 0 . 135∗∗ − 0 . 069 
(2 . 11) (0 . 48) (1 . 80) (0 . 84) (1 . 93) (0 . 72) (2 . 55) (0 . 85) 
T ang ibil ityt 0 . 075 − 2 . 754∗∗ − 0 . 092 0 . 434 − 0 . 199 − 1 . 057∗ − 0 . 070 0 . 211 
(0 . 10) (1 . 97) (0 . 54) (0 . 60) (0 . 76) (1 . 74) (0 . 59) (0 . 62) 
Lev er ag et 1 . 605∗∗∗ 2 . 324∗∗ − 0 . 297∗ − 0 . 845∗∗ 0 . 188 0 . 015 − 0 . 125 − 0 . 353∗∗ 
(3 . 06) (2 . 57) (1 . 73) (2 . 32) (0 . 54) (0 . 04) (1 . 57) (1 . 98) 
T ur nov ert − 3 . 286∗∗∗ − 3 . 409∗∗∗ 0 . 205∗∗∗ 0 . 333∗∗∗ − 0 . 806∗∗∗ − 0 . 686∗∗∗ 0 . 196∗∗∗ 0 . 102∗∗ 
(20 . 65) (18 . 15) (4 . 82) (4 . 25) (10 . 93) (7 . 29) (7 . 14) (2 . 36) 
B etat − 1 − 5 . 783∗∗∗ − 0 . 254 0 . 133∗ − 0 . 100 − 1 . 565∗∗∗ 0 . 011 0 . 362∗∗∗ 0 . 180∗∗∗ 
(27 . 93) (1 . 24) (1 . 79) (0 . 97) (14 . 76) (0 . 10) (7 . 35) (2 . 98) 
E xcess R et.t − 1 − 3 . 329∗∗∗ − 1 . 796∗∗∗ 0 . 054 0 . 103 − 0 . 665∗∗∗ − 0 . 349∗∗∗ 0 . 177∗∗∗ 0 . 120∗∗ 
(16 . 95) (10 . 10) (0 . 66) (1 . 11) (7 . 02) (3 . 74) (3 . 97) (2 . 28) 
E x. R et. S tdt − 1 32 . 655∗∗∗ 15 . 011∗∗∗ − 1 . 037∗∗ − 1 . 555∗∗ 8 . 993∗∗∗ 3 . 341∗∗∗ − 2 . 178∗∗∗ − 0 . 611 
(21 . 59) (11 . 00) (2 . 34) (2 . 55) (10 . 42) (4 . 27) (6 . 48) (1 . 53) 
E x. R et. S k ewt − 1 − 0 . 075 0 . 011 0 . 064∗∗∗ 0 . 037 − 0 . 058∗∗ − 0 . 020 0 . 023∗ 0 . 002 
(1 . 31) (0 . 26) (2 . 91) (1 . 58) (2 . 09) (0 . 82) (1 . 81) (0 . 14)
Y ear F .E . Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
I ndustr y F .E . Y Y Y Y 
F ir m F .E . Y Y Y Y 
# Observations 23,992 23,992 23,981 23,981 23,992 23,992 23,980 23,980
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for firm-specific heterogeneity, these results generally become insignificant. Further, 
when studying the change specifications, the significance disappears completely in both 
the cross-section and time-series. Again, with the caveat of not directly testing the 
null-hypothesis of no information environment effects, this does suggest that potentially 
the time-series evolution of risk factor disclosure identification does not have a strong 
influence in reducing information asymmetry or increasing liquidity. Interestingly, 
Specification (4) provides some evidence that increases in definitiveness may actually 
increase the bid-ask-spread, which would be consistent with the divergence argument 
of Kravet and Muslu (2013). 
2.3.3 Comparison of Risk Disclosures Measures 
The results from Table 2.4 support the first and second hypotheses, but it is unclear 
whether my measures of risk factors capture information differently than proxies used 
in previous literature. To test this, I compare one of the most used proxies in the 
literature, word count, to my measures of risk factor evolution. I repeat the analyses 
in in Table 2.4 and compare the number of words to the risk factors count variables. 
To separate my measure of risk factors from the word count, I decompose the word 
count into ( log(word count) – log(number of risk factors) ) and log(number of risk 
factors) .25 I then compare the difference between a cross-sectional approach and the 
time-series approach I use in my main tests to further clarify the difference between 
the measures. The results are presented in Table 2.10. Specifications (1)–(3) present 
the results of a pooled estimation approach, and Specifications (4)–(6) further include 
controls for firm specific heterogeneity.
25The former being equivalent to log(number of words / risk factor) .
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Table 2.10 : Predicting Net Loss: Aggregate vs Risk Factor Measures 
Table 2.10 reports results from probit regressions of future negative net income on risk factor measures, 
and controls of ex-ante risk. Specifications (1)–(3) present probit regressions. Specifications (4)–(6) 
present probit regressions with correlated random effects to absorb between firm variation. The 
coefficients represent average marginal effects, evaluated at the mean of the dependent variables. 
Industry is defined using the Fama-French 12 industry classification. The variables are defined 
in Appendix ?? . Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and absolute t-statistics 
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, 
respectively.
Pooled Probit Correlated Random Effects Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log (# of W or ds )t 0 . 066∗∗∗ 0 . 066∗∗∗ 
(11 . 26) (4 . 66) 
Log (# of W or ds/R F )t 0 . 063∗∗∗ 0 . 062∗∗∗ 0 . 035 0 . 034 
(5 . 09) (5 . 01) (1 . 37) (1 . 34) 
Log (# R F )t 0 . 070∗∗∗ 0 . 080∗∗∗ 
(9 . 94) (5 . 04) 
Log (# N ew R F )t 0 . 026∗∗∗ 0 . 017∗∗∗ 
(7 . 14) (4 . 14) 
Log (# D r opped R F )t − 0 . 007∗ − 0 . 020∗∗∗ 
(1 . 73) (4 . 54) 
Log (# R F )t − 1 0 . 049∗∗∗ 0 . 039∗∗∗ 
(6 . 91) (2 . 58) 
N et I ncome/ATt − 0 . 834∗∗∗ − 0 . 834∗∗∗ − 0 . 832∗∗∗ − 0 . 202∗∗∗ − 0 . 201∗∗∗ − 0 . 204∗∗∗ 
(23 . 70) (23 . 70) (23 . 75) (5 . 29) (5 . 27) (5 . 37) 
Log ( M ar k et E q uity )t − 0 . 042∗∗∗ − 0 . 041∗∗∗ − 0 . 042∗∗∗ 0 . 007 0 . 007 0 . 006 
(13 . 75) (13 . 76) (13 . 99) (0 . 75) (0 . 75) (0 . 70) 
B ig Nt − 0 . 002 − 0 . 002 − 0 . 001 − 0 . 000 − 0 . 000 − 0 . 000 
(0 . 25) (0 . 20) (0 . 13) (0 . 02) (0 . 01) (0 . 02) 
B ook − to − M ar k ett 0 . 026∗∗∗ 0 . 026∗∗∗ 0 . 025∗∗∗ 0 . 051∗∗∗ 0 . 051∗∗∗ 0 . 052∗∗∗ 
(6 . 26) (6 . 25) (6 . 16) (7 . 75) (7 . 75) (7 . 85) 
T ang ibil ityt − 0 . 015 − 0 . 015 − 0 . 016 0 . 166∗∗ 0 . 170∗∗ 0 . 169∗∗ 
(0 . 74) (0 . 75) (0 . 82) (2 . 16) (2 . 22) (2 . 22) 
Lev er ag et 0 . 001 0 . 001 0 . 001 − 0 . 125∗∗∗ − 0 . 124∗∗∗ − 0 . 122∗∗∗ 
(0 . 06) (0 . 06) (0 . 07) (3 . 03) (3 . 03) (2 . 97) 
T ur nov ert 0 . 030∗∗∗ 0 . 030∗∗∗ 0 . 029∗∗∗ 0 . 013∗ 0 . 013∗ 0 . 014∗∗ 
(6 . 32) (6 . 33) (6 . 10) (1 . 83) (1 . 84) (1 . 99) 
B etat − 1 0 . 046∗∗∗ 0 . 046∗∗∗ 0 . 047∗∗∗ 0 . 001 0 . 000 0 . 001 
(7 . 63) (7 . 66) (7 . 76) (0 . 08) (0 . 05) (0 . 18) 
E xcess R et.t − 1 − 0 . 062∗∗∗ − 0 . 062∗∗∗ − 0 . 062∗∗∗ − 0 . 062∗∗∗ − 0 . 062∗∗∗ − 0 . 060∗∗∗ 
(9 . 54) (9 . 56) (9 . 43) (8 . 89) (8 . 91) (8 . 74) 
E x. R et. S tdt − 1 2 . 722∗∗∗ 2 . 731∗∗∗ 2 . 680∗∗∗ − 0 . 267 − 0 . 255 − 0 . 219 
(9 . 02) (9 . 07) (8 . 90) (0 . 77) (0 . 74) (0 . 63) 
E x. R et. S k ewt − 1 0 . 000 0 . 000 0 . 000 − 0 . 000 − 0 . 000 − 0 . 000 
(0 . 07) (0 . 07) (0 . 02) (0 . 18) (0 . 17) (0 . 16)
Y ear F .E . Y Y Y Y Y Y 
I ndustr y F .E . Y Y Y 
C or r el ated R .E . Y Y Y 
# Observations 20,967 20,967 20,967 20,318 20,318 20,318 
# of Events 6,695 6,695 6,695 6,379 6,379 6,379
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Two features stand out in the analysis. The first is that the results of a pooled cross- 
sectional approach and a time series approach can differ significantly. For example 
in specification (2), the words per risk factor is strongly significant, but becomes 
insignificant in specification (5) when accounting for firm fixed effects. This supports 
the claim in this study that when evaluating informativeness, it is also important 
to consider how the disclosure evolves within the firm, rather than only comparing 
disclosures across firms. Second, the results suggest that managers convey their 
information primarily through adding and removing distinct risk factors, rather than 
through the summed word count across all factors. These results are also consistent 
with the supposition that managers treat risk factors as distinct, where each inclusion 
provides a separate signal. 
I perform the same test on the other adverse outcomes from Table 2.4, omitting 
tabulation of the controls for brevity. Table 2.11 compares the ability of word count 
and risk factor number in predicting sales declines and lawsuit intensity. The results 
are consistent with those from negative net income above, although in the cross section 
the total word count does not predict either outcome. For both outcomes, the number 
of risk factors is the dominant predictor, even after controlling for the same factors 
used in Table 2.4. Interestingly, while word count does not predict either outcome 
in the cross section, it does so once firm specific heterogeneity is controlled for with 
firm fixed effects. This further supports the conclusion that the informativeness of 
risk factors may be best measured in the time series rather than in the cross section. 
Table 2.12 compares the ability of word count and risk factor number in predicting 
two market outcomes: cumulative abnormal returns (measured over a three day 
window starting on the filing day), and bid ask spread (averaged over the subsequent 
year after the filing). The latter measure is consistent with the bid-ask spread window
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Table 2.11 : Comparing Measures: Adverse Outcomes Outcomes 
Table 2.11 reports results from regressions of future adverse outcomes on risk factor measures and 
controls of ex-ante risk. The dependent variables are S al es D ecl inet +1 and Law suit I ntensityt +1 in 
panels A and B respectively. The controls included are those found in Table 2.10, where Net Income / 
AT is replaced by Salest / AT and Lawsuit Intensityt in panels A and B respectively. The coefficients 
in Panel A represent average marginal effects, evaluated at the mean of the dependent variables. 
Industry is defined using the Fama-French 12 industry classification. The variables are defined 
in Appendix ?? . Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and absolute t-statistics 
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, 
respectively.
Panel A : Sales Decline
Pooled Probit Correlated Random Effects Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log (# of W or ds )t 0 . 004 0 . 073∗∗∗ 
(0 . 72) (5 . 01) 
Log (# of W or ds/R F )t − 0 . 003 − 0 . 007 0 . 050∗ 0 . 037 
(0 . 27) (0 . 60) (1 . 86) (1 . 42) 
Log (# R F )t 0 . 009 0 . 083∗∗∗ 
(1 . 28) (4 . 90) 
Log (# N ew R F )t 0 . 008∗∗ 0 . 013∗∗∗ 
(2 . 25) (2 . 97) 
Log (# D r opped R F )t 0 . 013∗∗∗ − 0 . 008∗ 
(3 . 10) (1 . 68) 
Log (# R F )t − 1 − 0 . 005 0 . 062∗∗∗ 
(0 . 71) (3 . 85)
Industry F.E. Y Y Y 
Correlated R.E. Y Y Y 
# Observations 20,967 20,967 20,967 20,318 20,318 20,318
Panel B : Lawsuit Intensity
Pooled OLS Firm Fixed Effects OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log (# of W or ds )t 0 . 006 0 . 041∗∗∗ 
(1 . 18) (2 . 84) 
Log (# of W or ds/R F )t 0 . 003 − 0 . 000 0 . 009 0 . 002 
(0 . 26) (0 . 01) (0 . 33) (0 . 09) 
Log (# R F )t 0 . 008 0 . 054∗∗∗ 
(1 . 20) (3 . 54) 
Log (# N ew R F )t 0 . 007∗∗ 0 . 012∗∗∗ 
(2 . 10) (3 . 08) 
Log (# D r opped R F )t 0 . 008∗∗ − 0 . 006 
(2 . 17) (1 . 27) 
Log (# R F )t − 1 − 0 . 001 0 . 048∗∗∗ 
(0 . 20) (3 . 30)
Industry F.E. Y Y Y 
Firm F.E. Y Y Y 
# Observations 25,278 25,278 25,278 25,278 25,278 25,278
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studied in Campbell et al. (2014). The results in Panel A suggest that the number 
of risk factors is more predictive of abnormal returns in both the cross section and 
time series. The results in Panel B specification (1) are consistent with the findings of 
Campbell et al. (2014), who conclude that risk factors have a convergent effect on 
market beliefs, because they lower information asymmetry. However, once I add firm 
fixed effects, this result becomes positive and insignificant. Further, specifications (5) 
and (6) actually suggest the contrary: increased verbosity in risk factors leads to more 
uncertainty. As discussed above, this is consistent with the divergent beliefs argument 
of Kravet and Muslu (2013), whereby risk factors bring new information to markets 
as signals of increased uncertainty. While the disagreement between Panel B and the 
findings of Campbell et al. (2014) could be due to potential sample or control variable 
differences, the stark contrast between specifications (1) and (4) again cautions against 
attributing the cross sectional market results to individual firm disclosures.
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Table 2.12 : Comparing Measures: Adverse Market Outcomes 
Table 2.12 reports results from regressions of future market outcomes on risk factor measures and 
controls of ex-ante risk. The dependent variables are C AR3 day s and B id − Ask S pr ead+1 y ear in 
panels A and B respectively. The controls included are those found in Table 2.10, where Net Income 
/ AT is replaced by the change in net income scaled by total assets, in both panels A and B. Industry 
is defined using the Fama-French 12 industry classification. The variables are defined in Appendix 
?? . Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and absolute t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively.
Panel A : Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Pooled OLS Firm Fixed Effects OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log (# of W or ds )t − 0 . 148∗∗ − 0 . 382∗ 
(2 . 04) (1 . 70) 
Log (# of W or ds/R F )t − 0 . 038 − 0 . 037 − 0 . 197 − 0 . 116 
(0 . 27) (0 . 26) (0 . 53) (0 . 31) 
Log (# R F )t − 0 . 199∗∗ − 0 . 516∗∗ 
(2 . 25) (2 . 15) 
Log (# N ew R F )t − 0 . 139∗∗ − 0 . 164∗∗ 
(2 . 41) (2 . 48) 
Log (# D r opped R F )t 0 . 038 0 . 010 
(0 . 60) (0 . 13) 
Log (# R F )t − 1 − 0 . 113 − 0 . 293 
(1 . 20) (1 . 12)
Industry F.E. Y Y Y 
Firm F.E. Y Y Y 
# Observations 24,000 24,000 24,000 24,000 24,000 24,000
Panel B : Bid Ask Spread
Pooled OLS Firm Fixed Effects OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log (# of W or ds )t − 0 . 226∗∗∗ 0 . 027 
(9 . 18) (0 . 73) 
Log (# of W or ds/R F )t − 0 . 050 − 0 . 033 0 . 133∗∗ 0 . 136∗∗∗ 
(1 . 19) (0 . 77) (2 . 51) (2 . 63) 
Log (# R F )t − 0 . 296∗∗∗ − 0 . 008 
(8 . 75) (0 . 20) 
Log (# N ew R F )t − 0 . 035∗∗∗ 0 . 007 
(2 . 98) (0 . 85) 
Log (# D r opped R F )t 0 . 022∗ − 0 . 003 
(1 . 76) (0 . 35) 
Log (# R F )t − 1 − 0 . 294∗∗∗ − 0 . 055 
(9 . 06) (1 . 30)
Industry F.E. Y Y Y 
Firm F.E. Y Y Y 
# Observations 24,000 24,000 24,000 24,000 24,000 24,000
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— Chapter 3 — 
Demand for Risk Factor Disclosure 
3.1 Hypothesis Development 
The motivation for basing my measures and tests on the regulation is that both 
investors and regulators provide incentive for managers to adhere to the regulation. 
To capture the validity of this assumption, I test whether these two forces (public 
regulators and private investors) actually demand timely and definitive risk factors. 
Observing demand directly is difficult, therefore I employ a methodology similar to 
that used in Rogers and Van Buskirk (2009) in which I measure manager’s disclosure 
response to a demand ‘shock.’ By observing how managers respond, I am able to draw 
conclusions about managers’ beliefs as to what disclosures the investors or regulators 
are demanding. While this assumes that managers are sufficiently incentive-aligned to 
supply information to meet the demand, the costs associated with not doing so are 
sufficient to justify this assumption, as discussed below. 
As argued in Chapter 2, one driving motivation for risk factor disclosures may 
be their potential benefit as a litigation shield. However, this same argument drives 
concern that “Management’s fear of exposing itself to substantial liability may cause 
it simply to bury the shareholders in an avalanche of trivial information” (Justice 
Marshall, TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 448-449, 1976). There are 
two primary reasons why this ‘over-disclosure’ outcome may not obtain: disclosure 
costs and regulatory oversight (discussed below). Firms face a plethora of disclosures 
costs, which they balance against the benefits accruing to disclosure. For risk factor
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disclosure, these costs could include proprietary costs stemming from competition 
(e.g. see Verrecchia, 2001), information acquisition or processing costs that increase in 
the amount of information provided (e.g. Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Sims, 2003; 
Bloomfield, 2002), or market costs associated with increased risk assessments (e.g. 
Heinle and Smith, 2015; Johnstone, 2016). When making the decision to disclose 
each risk factor, managers must trade off the benefit of disclosing that specific risk 
factor against its costs. This suggests that firms are unlikely to disclose completely- 
uninformative risk factors, or an overabundance of risk factors, because the costs of 
such disclosures will eventually outweigh the negligible marginal benefits. Consistent 
with this conclusion, Nelson and Pritchard (2016) find that during the voluntary 
regime (prior to 2005), risk disclosures were informative and limited in length. Short 
of disclosure overload, however, it is unclear ex ante whether investors view risk factors 
as effective litigation shields and thereby demand their disclosure. To test this, I use 
securities litigation as a direct demand for information from private investors. 
Securities litigation as a private enforcement event can be significantly costly to a 
firm (Rose, 2008), thus managers are likely to attempt to reduce their litigation risk 
by disclosing information they believe investors demand (Skinner, 1994; White, 2013). 
If they believe risk factors provide a litigation shield, then a private enforcement 
event will signal deficient disclosures, and managers will increase their disclosure as a 
result. On the other hand, if managers believe disclosure causes litigation risk (Francis, 
Philbrick, and Schipper, 1994; Rogers and Van Buskirk, 2009), then managers will 
scale back their disclosures after a private enforcement event. However, given the legal 
practitioner guidance on the litigation value of risk factor disclosure (e.g. Robbins 
and Rothenberg, 2005), I expect that unlike voluntary disclosures, firms will increase 
their risk factor disclosures after a private enforcement event. As discussed above,
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court precedence requires risks factor disclosures to be definitive and specific to the 
risk they address. Therefore, I expect that in response to a private enforcement event, 
firms will increase both the number of risk factors they identify and the definitiveness 
of their disclosure. 
H3: Firms respond to private enforcement by identifying more risk factors 
and increasing their definitiveness. 
Regulatory oversight also potentially plays a role in mitigating disclosure overload 
through the comment letter process, which Cox, Thomas, and Kiku (2003) describe as 
the “first line of defense against ongoing disclosure violations.” Johnston and Petacchi 
(2017) find that comment letters often result in restatements and improvements in 
market information environment, but no subsequent changes to voluntary disclosure. 
Bozanic et al. (2015) find that firms improve both qualitative and quantitative features 
in their disclosures in response to an SEC comment letter. Brown et al. (2015) find that 
firms modify their risk factor disclosures after they or an influential peer (competitor 
or industry leader) receive a comment letter from the SEC pertaining to insufficient 
risk factor disclosures. Together, these studies provide strong evidence that the SEC 
comment letter process leads to disclosure improvements. Therefore, I use these SEC 
comment letters as an indicator of demand for information from regulators. 
The incentives of public enforcement differ from those of investors (Cox et al., 
2003). The demand for information from the SEC is reflected in their stated goals:1 
All investors, whether large institutions or private individuals, should have 
access to certain basic facts about an investment prior to buying it, and so 
long as they hold it. To achieve this, the SEC requires public companies 
to disclose meaningful financial and other information to the public. This
1From www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml
 51 
provides a common pool of knowledge for all investors to use to judge for 
themselves whether to buy, sell, or hold a particular security. Only through 
the steady flow of timely, comprehensive, and accurate information can 
people make sound investment decisions. 
However, the SEC is also resource and capacity constrained (Cox et al., 2003; 
Jackson and Roe, 2009). The information set available to the review process comprises 
the disclosures provided by the firm.2 In the absence of manager’s private information, 
it is unclear that the SEC reviewer has the capacity to identify novel omitted, yet 
significant, risk factors on any systematic basis. This is consistent with the claims 
made by the SEC: “The Division’s review process is not a guarantee that the disclosure 
is complete and accurate.”3 However, they do have the ability to measure and enforce 
the definitiveness of disclosures they review, and require adherence to the wording of 
the regulation Item 503(c), specifically: This discussion must be concise and organized 
logically. Do not present risks that could apply to any issuer or any offering. Explain 
how the risk affects the issuer or the securities being offered. Because the SEC review 
process vis-a`-vis risk factors is guided by this regulation, I expect the reviews to 
identify and request improvements in vague or generic disclosures. Thus, I predict 
that the SEC comment letters will result in improvements in the definitiveness of 
subsequent disclosures. However, given the resource and information constraints 
reviewers face, I do not expect that public enforcement will result in firms expanding 
the set of risk factors they identify. 
H4: Firms respond to public enforcement by increasing the definitiveness 
of risks they identify.
2 See www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cffilingreview.htm 
3Id., referring to the Division of Corporation Finance.
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While these hypotheses do not directly address information overload, the manager’s 
reactions to both public and private enforcement events can provide evidence of their 
beliefs about stakeholders’ views on information overload. Given that the enforcement 
actions I examine are punitive in nature, managers wishing to avoid future action 
will correct their disclosures consistent with the incentives driving the enforcement 
action. If investors or regulators believe risk factor disclosures are boilerplate and 
uninformative, managers should update and provide more detail in their disclosures 
to avoid future penalties. Ultimately, this is an empirical question, one that has not 
been completely addressed in the literature. While Brown et al. (2015) suggest that 
comment letters impact firms’ disclosure, the proxies they use (cosine similarity and 
absolute value of the change in length) do not indicate directionality nor differentiate 
between risk factors. The directionality of the response is of primary importance 
in addressing information overload because it indicates the direction of the demand. 
Similarly, Beatty et al. (2015) find that firms increase their disclosure lengths after 
receiving a comment letter from the SEC. However, they also find that the correlation 
between disclosure of financial constraints and their measure of the underlying financial 
constraints decreases after SEC comment letter intervention. They conclude that 
‘less is more,’ but do not address the questions of why the SEC would prompt firms 
for more disclosure if it is uninformative, nor what disclosure changes the SEC may 
be trying to elicit. The intent of analyzing firm reaction to public and private 
enforcement, specifically by differentiating between the evolution of risk factors and 
their definitiveness, is to shed light on this question of whether and to what extent 
investors and regulators value these disclosures.
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3.2 Results 
Given the results that managers disclose risk factors in a timely and informative 
manner, I then turn to how firms respond to demand for these disclosures. To 
test the third hypothesis, I measure private and public disclosure demand with 
indicator variables representing securities litigation and comment letters, respectively. 
I separately regress each of the six risk factor disclosure measures (the time series 
evolution and definitiveness variables) on the indicators equal to one if a public or 
private enforcement event occurred during the course of the fiscal year. I also include 
two lagged indicators of both enforcement events to capture the longevity of manager’s 
responses to these events. This will capture the effect that demand for information 
has on disclosures in the subsequent three filings. In addition to the same controls 
used in the previous tables including firm fixed effects, I also include lagged values of 
the dependent variable to control for serial correlation in the variables. 
The results in Table 3.1 suggest that managers respond to private enforcement by 
increasing the new risk factors they identify, which results in an increase in the total 
number of risk factors disclosed. In subsequent years, firms continue identifying more 
new risk factors and also increase the number of risk factors they remove from their 
disclosures, resulting in an overall increase in risk factors that persists for multiple 
years. Together, these results support my third hypothesis that private enforcement 
actions evoke the disclosure of more risk factors. Additionally, the subsequent increase 
in dropped risk factors is consistent with the suggestion in Slayton vs. American 
Express that risk factors should be continually updated. In contrast, Specification (4) 
suggests that managers do not believe that increasing the verbosity of risk factors is 
demanded by investors, which is consistent with the results in Table 2.12 Specification 
(6). Together, the results in Table 3.1 also support the conclusion that managers
 54 
Table 3.1 : Enforcement Response: Risk Factors 
Table 3.1 reports results from firm fixed effect regressions of risk factor evolution –total, new, and 
dropped– on public and private enforcement events. The variables are defined in Appendix ?? . 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and absolute t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively.
Log(# Total RFs) Log(# New RFs) Log(# Dropped RFs) Log(# Words/RF)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
S ec. Litig ationt − 1 0 . 031∗∗∗ 0 . 178∗∗∗ 0 . 027 0 . 008 
(2 . 67) (4 . 38) (0 . 76) (1 . 21) 
—t − 2 0 . 004 0 . 099∗∗ 0 . 096∗∗ 0 . 005 
(0 . 44) (2 . 48) (2 . 48) (0 . 83) 
—t − 3 0 . 023∗∗∗ 0 . 145∗∗∗ 0 . 065∗ − 0 . 002 
(3 . 05) (4 . 04) (1 . 87) (0 . 30) 
R F C ommentt − 1 0 . 004 0 . 072∗∗∗ 0 . 063∗∗∗ 0 . 010∗∗∗ 
(0 . 88) (3 . 11) (2 . 88) (3 . 14) 
—t − 2 0 . 005 0 . 006 0 . 004 0 . 005∗ 
(0 . 98) (0 . 26) (0 . 21) (1 . 72) 
—t − 3 − 0 . 005 − 0 . 050∗∗ − 0 . 026 0 . 005 
(1 . 17) (2 . 27) (1 . 31) (1 . 61) 
Log (# R F )t − 1 0 . 532∗∗∗ − 0 . 438∗∗∗ 1 . 069∗∗∗ 
(33 . 00) (10 . 38) (27 . 15) 
Log (# N ew R F )t − 1 − 0 . 027∗∗∗ 
(3 . 81) 
Log (# D r opped R F )t − 1 − 0 . 091∗∗∗ 
(11 . 87) 
Log (# of W or ds/R F )t − 1 0 . 499∗∗∗ 
(30 . 52) 
Log ( M ar k et E q uity )t 0 . 010∗∗∗ 0 . 010 − 0 . 050∗∗∗ 0 . 002 
(2 . 66) (0 . 68) (3 . 65) (0 . 93) 
B ook − to − M ar k ett 0 . 013∗∗∗ 0 . 037∗∗∗ − 0 . 001 0 . 005∗∗∗ 
(4 . 80) (3 . 32) (0 . 09) (2 . 61) 
C omment ( Any )t − 1 0 . 005∗∗ 0 . 031∗∗∗ 0 . 022∗∗ 0 . 001 
(2 . 03) (2 . 79) (2 . 22) (0 . 87) 
S al es Gr ow tht 0 . 018∗∗∗ 0 . 086∗∗∗ 0 . 067∗∗∗ − 0 . 001 
(3 . 42) (3 . 15) (2 . 68) (0 . 28) 
Lev er ag et 0 . 070∗∗∗ 0 . 285∗∗∗ − 0 . 017 0 . 042∗∗∗ 
(4 . 74) (4 . 59) (0 . 34) (4 . 99) 
T ur nov ert 0 . 006∗∗ 0 . 079∗∗∗ 0 . 059∗∗∗ 0 . 003 
(2 . 13) (6 . 18) (4 . 94) (1 . 44) 
E xcess R et.t − 1 − 0 . 003 − 0 . 018 0 . 039∗∗∗ − 0 . 009∗∗∗ 
(1 . 05) (1 . 32) (3 . 22) (4 . 43) 
E x. R et. S tdt − 1 0 . 288∗ 4 . 327∗∗∗ 2 . 706∗∗∗ 0 . 322∗∗∗ 
(1 . 94) (6 . 54) (4 . 33) (3 . 29) 
E x. R et. S k ewt − 1 − 0 . 002∗∗ − 0 . 000 0 . 004 − 0 . 000 
(2 . 11) (0 . 12) (1 . 02) (0 . 60)
Y ear & F ir m F .E . Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.497 0.056 0.113 0.375 
# Observations 23,209 23,209 23,209 23,201
believe risk factors to be a potential litigation shield. This result is in contrast to the 
study by Rogers and Van Buskirk (2009), which finds that firms actually decrease 
their provision of voluntary disclosure in response to shareholder litigation. My novel
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evidence of disclosure increase is significant because it points to a potentially less 
risky substitute for the litigation shield disclosures studied in previous literature (e.g., 
Skinner (1994, 1997; Francis et al., 1994; Field, Lowry, and Shu, 2005; Rogers and 
Van Buskirk, 2009; Cutler, Davis, and Peterson, 2016). 
Table 3.1 also provides evidence consistent with the argument that the SEC 
comment letter process does not expand the set risk factors identified by firms. This 
may be due to the limited capacity or information set of the SEC (Cox et al., 2003; 
Jackson and Roe, 2009), or may indicate that the SEC does not dictate risk factor 
disclosures on a regular basis.4 firms do increase the number of new risk factors they 
identify, but also increase the number they remove. Together with the evidence of no 
change in overall number, this may be an indicator of the SEC requesting improved 
risk factor organization or more detailed headings from firms.5 The influence of the 
SEC seems to be short lived, as only the filing immediately following the comment 
letters are materially affected; subsequent filings return to the ‘normal’ firm level of 
disclosure updates. Specification (4) demonstrates that firms do increase the verbosity 
of their risk factor disclosures however. This result contrasts previous findings by 
Beatty et al. (2015) and Brown et al. (2015), who both argue that risk disclosure 
increases on average after an SEC comment letter. My results suggest a contrary view, 
that while the length of disclosure increases, the number of identified factors does not. 
My third and fourth hypotheses predict an increase in definitiveness in response 
to public and private enforcement actions. To test this, I again regress the textual 
features on indicator variables for public and private enforcement actions for the 
previous three years. Rather than regressing these features and the controls on the
4A notable exception to this practice is the Cyber-security risk factor disclosure guidance issued in 
2011. See: www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfguidance-topic2.htm. 
5One example of this is the comment letter to Target referenced in Brown et al. (2015).
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change in definitiveness, I allow for more flexible serial correlation by using the level 
as a dependent variable, with the lagged value as an additional control. These results 
are presented in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2 : Enforcement Response: Textual Features 
Table 3.2 reports results from firm fixed effect regressions of risk factor textual features on public 
and private enforcement events. The variables are defined in Appendix ?? . Robust standard errors 
are clustered at the firm level and absolute t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively.
Specificity Number % Words / RF
(1) (2) (3)
S ec. Litig ationt − 1 0 . 154∗ 0 . 049∗ 0 . 666 
(1 . 87) (1 . 82) (1 . 03) 
—t − 2 0 . 006 0 . 034 0 . 671 
(0 . 07) (1 . 21) (1 . 12) 
—t − 3 − 0 . 060 − 0 . 036 − 0 . 199 
(0 . 83) (1 . 32) (0 . 39) 
R F C ommentt − 1 0 . 125∗∗ 0 . 046∗∗∗ 0 . 895∗∗∗ 
(2 . 49) (2 . 86) (2 . 95) 
—t − 2 − 0 . 039 0 . 040∗∗∗ 0 . 373 
(0 . 87) (2 . 75) (1 . 29) 
—t − 3 0 . 015 0 . 002 0 . 352 
(0 . 36) (0 . 16) (1 . 29) 
S pecif icityt − 1 0 . 456∗∗∗ 
(36 . 69) 
N umer ic I ntensityt − 1 0 . 448∗∗∗ 
(38 . 94) 
# of W or ds/R Ft − 1 0 . 501∗∗∗ 
(26 . 98) 
Log ( M ar k et E q uity )t − 0 . 033 − 0 . 073∗∗∗ 0 . 176 
(1 . 13) (6 . 63) (0 . 84) 
B ook − to − M ar k ett 0 . 008 0 . 012 0 . 329∗ 
(0 . 33) (1 . 56) (1 . 71) 
C omment ( Any )t − 1 − 0 . 005 − 0 . 005 0 . 032 
(0 . 24) (0 . 68) (0 . 22) 
S al es Gr ow tht − 0 . 062 − 0 . 061∗∗∗ − 0 . 204 
(1 . 35) (3 . 58) (0 . 65) 
Lev er ag et 0 . 364∗∗∗ 0 . 178∗∗∗ 3 . 611∗∗∗ 
(2 . 84) (4 . 09) (4 . 16) 
T ur nov ert 0 . 011 0 . 020∗∗ 0 . 309∗ 
(0 . 47) (2 . 14) (1 . 77) 
E xcess R et.t − 1 − 0 . 104∗∗∗ − 0 . 020∗∗ − 0 . 864∗∗∗ 
(4 . 01) (2 . 18) (4 . 63) 
E x. R et. S tdt − 1 4 . 471∗∗∗ 1 . 437∗∗∗ 30 . 408∗∗∗ 
(3 . 47) (2 . 84) (3 . 38) 
E x. R et. S k ewt − 1 0 . 005 − 0 . 004 − 0 . 029 
(0 . 59) (1 . 54) (0 . 56)
Y ear & F ir m F .E . Y Y Y 
R2 0.251 0.277 0.358 
# Observations 23,201 23,201 23,201
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The results in Table 3.2 provide only weak evidence in support of the third 
hypothesis. The marginally significant coefficients on Securities Litigationt − 1 in 
specifications (1) and (2) suggest that private enforcement, at most, elicits a weak 
increase in level of detail with which managers disclose their risk factors. Together 
with the evidence from Table 3.1, this suggests that managers believe the legal value 
of risk factors stems from the disclosure of individual risk factors, rather than the 
level of detail. One potential reason is that firms facing litigation already have a 
high level of specificity, such that managers interpret the private enforcement as a 
signal of insufficient identification of risk factors, rather than insufficient definitiveness. 
Alternatively, firms could be withholding specificity because they believe that providing 
definitive expositional disclosure opens them up to litigation risk. Consistent with 
the former explanation, firms facing a securities litigation have on average 8.2% and 
5.1% higher levels of specificity and numeric intensity, respectively, when compared to 
the non-litigation firm years, and both differences are significant at the five percent 
level. However, in total, the results do not provide strong evidence that firms react 
to private enforcement by increasing the definitiveness of their risk factor disclosures. 
These results are in contrast to the regulatory focus and court precedence, which both 
highlight the importance of detail in cautionary language. 
The results in Table 3.2 provide strong evidence consistent with the fourth hy- 
pothesis that managers react to public enforcement by increasing the definitiveness 
of their risk factor disclosures. Firms significantly increase the specificity, numeric 
intensity, and length of each risk factor in response to SEC comment letters. This 
effect seems to be temporary, with the increase only occurring in the disclosure imme- 
diately succeeding the comment letter, with the exception of numeric intensity, which 
persists for two years. The regressions control for lagged values of the dependent
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variables, thus effectively demonstrate an increase in the change of definitiveness, 
not whether these increases in definitive detail persist. To test the persistence, in 
an untabulated regression I repeat this analysis without controlling for the lagged 
values of the dependent variables, and find that these increases in definitiveness do 
persist and are significant for multiple years. This suggests that firms do not undo 
the improvements in definitiveness that the SEC evokes. 
Together with Table 3.1, these results suggest that when managers receive an SEC 
comment letter about risk factor disclosure inadequacies, they respond by updating 
their disclosures in the immediately subsequent annual report, but then go back to 
their normal update procedure (i.e. the SEC does not cause firms to fundamentally 
to alter the underlying data generating process). However it is important to note that 
while a comment letter only temporarily changes how firms update their disclosures, 
these improvements to increased definitiveness persist: managers do not revert to the 
pre-comment letter disclosures. This is consistent with the expected costs of the SEC 
review process, which can evoke immediate changes, but pose few continuing costs 
once the no further comment letter is received. In contrast, private litigation does 
have a continuing effect on the updates that persists for multiple years, consistent 
with the expectation of future litigation costs being significantly higher (Rose, 2008). 
The results suggest that managers adjust the how they re-address their risk factors 
year over year (i.e. changing the underlying data generating process), for example by 
lowering the threshold of what qualifies as a significant factor , leading to an increase 
in total number of risks they identify. This contrast between the SEC evoking a 
‘one-off’ change to disclosure updates and securities litigation evoking a more lasting 
change to disclosure updates is potentially of relevance in the ongoing legal literature 
on whether securities litigation is a useful governance mechanism (Rose, 2008).
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3.2.1 Alternative Measure of Investor Demand 
One potential concern with studying the response to a private enforcement event as 
a demonstration of demand for information is that managers may be responding to 
economic changes brought about by the litigation. This issue is less likely to affect 
the SEC comment letter results, because previous literature has not found significant 
changes in the economic behavior of firms in response to SEC comment letters (Ryans, 
2017).6 To ameliorate this concern, I therefore study a plausibly exogenous shock 
to investor demand previously used in the literature by employing the Russell index 
inclusion discontinuity. While this is not a perfect substitute, as it primarily captures 
the effect of sophisticated investors through increased institutional ownership, it 
at least is suggestive of the demand for risk factor disclosures from a significantly 
influential subset of investors (Crane, Michenaud, and Weston, 2016). 
The identification strategy uses a regression discontinuity based on the Russell 
1000 and 2000 indexes, which are published by Russell Investment and tracked by a 
large quantity of investor equity. The Russell 1000 tracks larger firms, but Chang, 
Hong, and Liskovich (2015) report that as of 2008, $168.6 Billion USD was indexed 
to the Russell 1000 while $236.7 Billion USD was indexed to the Russell 2000. The 
Russell indexes are rebalanced yearly by Russell Investments on June 30th. On the last 
trading day of May each year, the largest 3000 stocks7 are ordered by market equity 
and two value weighted indexes are formed, the Russell 1000 containing the largest 
1000, and the Russell 2000 containing the next 2000 smaller firms. The sequential
6Ryans (2017) actually finds higher earnings in the year preceding a comment letter, but no significant 
reduction in earnings in contemporaneous or subsequent years. 
7 Actual eligibility requires the security be incorporated/headquartered in the US, trade on at least 
one major US exchange, have a close price greater than $1 USD, market cap greater than $30 Million 
USD, have greater than 5% shares available for trade, and have an eligible corporate structure. 
Source and further details at http://www.russell.com/indexes/documents/Methodology.pdf .
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ordering method of creating the indexes results in firm 1000 in the Russell 1000 and 
firm 1 in the Russell 2000 being almost identical in size. However the weight assigned 
to the largest Russell 2000 firm is 91.7 times larger (on average) than the smallest 
Russell 1000 firm. The result of this is that every institutional investor that tracks the 
Russell 2000 index holds the two stocks in vastly different proportions (if they hold 
the small Russell 1000 stock at all, transaction costs considered). This investment 
discrepancy is purely caused by the Russell indexing weights, thus provides for a 
setting in which a regression discontinuity design can be applied. 
Regression discontinuity (RD) is a methodology which has been used in the 
Economics literature since Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960) used it to study 
whether merit recommendations for schoolchildren led to scholarships and subsequent 
life performance. The intuition behind the methodology is similar to typical treatment 
vs control matching. If the cause of the discontinuity is unrelated (or even related but 
with uncertainty) to the variable being measured, then the assignment into treatment 
or control can be considered “as-if” random. In this case, the two firms on either 
side of the index split are almost identical, potentially one trading day away from 
switching places. However because of an insignificant difference in price on May 30th, 
one receives a huge increase in institutional investors. This institutional holding— 
unrelated to the fundamental characteristics of either firm—is arguably the only 
significant difference between the firms, thus the Russell 1000 firm can be used as a 
close match for how the Russell 2000 firm would have behaved had it not received 
investment. This allows for causal inferences that can be attributed specifically to 
increases in institutional investment. 
I estimate the effect of exogenous change in institutional ownership using the 
RD design established in Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014) to estimate the
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bandwidth. I derive separate coverage error optimal bandwidths (see Calonico, Catta- 
neo, and Farrell, 2016), and estimate the difference across the continuity using their 
bias-adjusted robust methodology for calculating confidence intervals and statistics. 
The measure the effect of institutional investment on the risk factor measures I develop 
in this study, and present the results in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3 : Risk Factor Disclosures and Institutional Investor Demand 
Table 3.3 presents the results of the Russell index inclusion regression discontinuity. The results 
use the optimal bandwidth selection algorithm developed in Calonico et al. (2014). The variables 
are defined in Appendix ?? . Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and absolute 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 
0.10 level, respectively.
Variable Difference Std. Err. Z-statistic P( > | Z | )
New Risk Factors 2 . 215∗∗ 0 . 937 2 . 354 0 . 019 
Dropped Risk Factors 3 . 364∗∗∗ 1 . 162 2 . 907 0 . 004 
Total Risk Factors 6 . 359∗ 3 . 553 1 . 764 0 . 078 
Specificity − 4 . 244∗∗∗ 1 . 424 − 2 . 936 0 . 003 
Numerical Intensity − 0 . 351 0 . 259 − 1 . 368 0 . 171 
Words per Risk Factor − 7 . 551 7 . 279 − 1 . 034 0 . 301 
Institutional Ownership 0 . 336∗∗∗ 0 . 072 4 . 570 0 . 000
The results in Table 3.3 show an increase in institutional ownership is associated 
with an increase in the number of new and removed risk factors disclosed. This 
is generally consistent with the results in Table 3.1. Firms with high institutional 
ownership also disclose a larger total number of risk factors, which, while marginally 
significant, is consistent with the response to private enforcement results being an 
increase in the risks identified by managers. Somewhat consistent with Table 3.2, the 
increase in institutional ownership is not associated with quantitative definitiveness 
or verbosity, but is associated with lower specificity. One potential reason for this 
may be that firms suddenly adding six new risk factor disclosures (on average) could 
result in more generic disclosures, or less information being compounded into each 
risk factor. However another reason may be that the class of investors studied in
 62 
the regression discontinuity is primarily indexing institutions and liquidity traders,8 
who may derive an informational advantage from private information. Lundholm 
(1991) suggests that increased precision in a public signal concentrates the demand for 
private information, potentially reducing the average returns to private information 
acquisition. As a whole, however, the results in Table 3.3 lend supporting evidence to 
the conclusions drawn from the private enforcement response tests. 
3.2.2 Risk Factor Disclosures as a Litigation Shield 
The results in Table 3.1 demonstrate that managers react to private enforcement by 
providing more disclosures, which suggests they believe risk factors to be an effective 
litigation shield. However, the extant literature has largely focused on voluntary 
disclosures when studying the litigation shield hypothesis; it is unclear whether risk 
factors, as a mandatory disclosure, would have the same legal benefit. To provide 
suggestive evidence of this, I test whether managers disclose risk factors in advance 
of litigation events rather than just in reaction to them. Similar to the motivation 
behind the tests of hypotheses one and two, if managers do believe risk factors provide 
a litigation shield, they will preemptively increase the disclosure of risk factors as the 
expectation of litigation increases. I initially provide graphical evidence of this by 
observing the time-series variation in risk factor disclosure around securities litigation 
events. 
Figure 3.1 demonstrates the average number of risk factors in event time around 
the filing of a securities litigation. On average, it appears as if firms start increasing 
the number of risk factors they disclose in the immediately preceding annual report. 
The increase in risk factors appears to persist for an additional two years after the
8Specifically, quasi-indexers and transient investors in the Bushee (1998) classification.
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Figure 3.1 : Number of Risk Factors Around Securities Litigation Filing 
Figure 3.1 plots the average number of risk factors in event-time. Year zero corresponds 
to the last annual report filed before the securities litigation was filed. Year one corre- 
sponds to the first annual report filed immediately after the litigation. Observations 
are averaged across all firms with securities litigations during the sample period with 
at least one annual report before and after the litigation filing.
litigation filing, suggesting a lasting response consistent with the results in Table 3.1. 
To bring more statistical rigor to this graphical evidence, I then test whether managers 
update their risk factor disclosure to preempt the securities litigation by employing a 
predictive framework similar to that used in Table 2.4. These tests are presented in 
Table 3.4. 
The results in Table 3.4 suggest that managers do, on average, increase their risk 
factor disclosures in advance of securities litigation. Specification (1) includes the full 
sample of securities litigation events, including settled, dismissed, and ongoing lawsuits.
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Table 3.4 : Risk Factor Disclosure and Securities Litigation 
Table 3.4 reports results from probit and linear regressions of securities litigation outcomes on 
risk factor disclosures and controls. Specifications (1)–(3) are run on the full sample of firm years; 
the dependent variable in specification (1) is all litigation events, while the dependent variable in 
specifications (2) and (3) is settled and dismissed litigation events respectively. Specification (4) is 
run on the subsample of litigation events, and the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the litigation is 
settled, and zero otherwise (dismissed or ongoing). Specifications (5) and (6) are performed on only 
settled litigations, and the dependent variable, class period length, is the number of days between 
the class start and class end as identified in the litigation. The coefficients in Specifications (1)–(4) 
represent average marginal effects, evaluated at the mean of the dependent variables. Industry is 
defined using the Fama-French 12 industry classification. The variables are defined in Appendix 
?? . Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and absolute t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively.
All Settled Dismissed Settled Class Length
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log (# N ew R F )t 0 . 003∗∗ 0 . 002∗∗∗ − 0 . 000 0 . 105∗∗∗ − 94 . 815∗∗ − 94 . 240 
(2 . 26) (2 . 85) (0 . 49) (5 . 75) (2 . 34) (1 . 76) 
Log (# D r opped R F )t − 0 . 003∗∗ − 0 . 002∗∗ − 0 . 000 − 0 . 071∗∗∗ 1 . 585 11 . 034 
(1 . 98) (2 . 34) (0 . 03) (4 . 31) (0 . 03) (0 . 17) 
Log (# R F )t − 1 0 . 001 0 . 001 − 0 . 001 0 . 041∗ − 49 . 868 − 52 . 110 
(0 . 58) (1 . 16) (0 . 69) (1 . 76) (0 . 71) (0 . 67) 
Log ( M ar k et E q uity )t 0 . 015∗∗∗ 0 . 006∗∗∗ 0 . 007∗∗∗ 0 . 010 8 . 729 
(8 . 16) (5 . 49) (5 . 51) (0 . 89) (0 . 38) 
B ook − to − M ar k ett − 0 . 002 0 . 001 − 0 . 002∗∗ 0 . 087∗∗∗ − 84 . 053∗ 
(1 . 32) (1 . 04) (2 . 50) (2 . 80) (2 . 00) 
B ig Nt 0 . 006 0 . 002 0 . 001 − 0 . 127∗∗ 5 . 367 
(0 . 89) (0 . 51) (0 . 19) (2 . 01) (0 . 05) 
S al es Gr ow tht 0 . 006 − 0 . 000 0 . 003 − 0 . 086 − 155 . 945 
(1 . 56) (0 . 17) (1 . 42) (1 . 18) (1 . 71) 
Lev er ag et − 0 . 008 0 . 002 − 0 . 009∗ − 0 . 093 − 258 . 378 
(1 . 13) (0 . 37) (1 . 89) (1 . 36) (1 . 36) 
T ur nov ert 0 . 004∗∗∗ 0 . 001 0 . 002∗ − 0 . 029 − 102 . 124∗ 
(2 . 94) (1 . 39) (1 . 95) (0 . 89) (2 . 13) 
E xcess R et.t − 1 − 0 . 007∗∗∗ − 0 . 003∗∗ − 0 . 004∗∗∗ 0 . 009 − 91 . 141 
(3 . 50) (2 . 44) (2 . 81) (0 . 28) (1 . 38) 
E x. R et. S tdt − 1 0 . 328∗∗ 0 . 130∗ 0 . 162∗ 1 . 604 − 797 . 140 
(2 . 54) (1 . 78) (1 . 77) (0 . 90) (0 . 15) 
E x. R et. S k ewt − 1 − 0 . 001 0 . 000 − 0 . 001∗∗ 0 . 001 29 . 729 
(1 . 41) (0 . 38) (2 . 18) (0 . 08) (0 . 86) 
M in. E xcess R et.t − 1 0 . 014 0 . 004 0 . 011 0 . 354 − 613 . 120 
(0 . 71) (0 . 32) (0 . 78) (0 . 88) (0 . 70)
Y ear F .E . Y Y Y Y Y Y 
I ndustr y F .E . Y Y Y 
F P S I ndustr y Y Y Y Y Y 
C or r el ated R .E . Y Y Y 
# Observations 29,413 29,413 29,413 497 160 160 
# Litigations 491 156 233 160
On average, firms increase the number of new risk factors identified, and decrease 
the number removed before securities litigation filings. Specifications (2) and (3) of
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Table use only settled and dismissed litigations, respectively, as a dependent variable. 
The results show that firms disclose increased risk factors in advance of litigation 
filings that eventually settle, but have no abnormal forewarning of litigation filings 
that are dismissed. This is consistent with some of the current academic legal opinion 
that many securities litigations are inaccurate in identifying fraudulent disclosures 
(Rose, 2008; Choi and Pritchard, 2016). If dismissed litigations are indicative of 
a ‘scattershot approach’ (Choi and Pritchard, 2016), then managers should not be 
expected to forecast these spurious cases. Specification (4) comprises just the reduced 
sample of firms that face a securities litigation, and use settled outcomes as the 
dependent variable, effectively comparing settled to dismissed (or ongoing) litigations. 
The results confirm those from the full sample, that managers provide significantly 
more risk factor disclosures in advance of settled cases. Together, these results suggest 
that managers seem to forecast securities litigation events, but any conclusions suffer 
from the endogeneity problem stemming from disclosure potentially causing litigation 
(Field et al., 2005). 
I attempt to address the endogeneity issue in Specifications (5) and (6) by testing 
whether the inclusion of risk factors has an effect on the class period length. This 
is motivated by the method through which disclosure can act as a litigation shield 
(Skinner, 1994, 1997). Skinner argues that timely disclosures can potentially shorten 
the class period length because it provides the corrective disclosure, which ends the 
class period. If this is the case, then disclosing risk factors would be associated with 
shorter class period lengths. 
I test whether timely risk factor disclosures reduce class period length by regressing 
the number of days between the class start period and end period as defined in 
the securities litigation on firm’s risk factor disclosures. Specification (3) suggests
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managers may not be capable of (or have incentives to) disclose risk factors warning 
of dismissed suits, thus I focus on the subsample of 160 lawsuits which are eventually 
settled.9 Specification (5) omits controls, effectively testing the correlation between 
disclosure and class period length, and finds that disclosing more risk factors is 
significantly associated with a shorter class period. This suggests that more risk 
factors may cause, or at least are associated with, shorter class periods. However, in 
Specification (6), which includes the controls used in the previous specifications, the 
significance on the relation between new risk factors and class period length becomes 
insignificant (p-value = 0.11).10 This suggests that the increase in risk factors which 
cannot be explained by ex-ante risk are not associated with lower class period lengths, 
or conversely, that the lower class period length is related to correlated omitted factors 
in Specification (5). Together, this provides suggestive evidence consistent with the 
litigation shield value of risk factors.
9This test of only settled litigations potentially presents a selection problem, therefore I also perform 
an untabulated robustness test using a Heckman selection model for Specification (5) where the 
selection for settled versus dismissed is a function of the controls from Specification (6). I find 
similar results on the coefficient estimate, with lower power (p-value = 0.052). 
10Because the point estimate is quantitatively similar however, the difference may stem from lack of 
power given the lowered degrees of freedom.
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— Chapter 4 — 
Risk Factor Disclosure Topics 
The previous sections treat individual risk factors as fungible, namely that they 
have equal weighting in their disclosure, as well as their predictive ability of adverse 
outcomes. This assumption is unlikely to hold, as multiple risk factors commonly 
address multiple different risks of adverse events which potentially have differing 
impacts on For example a disclosure about the risk surrounding a new drug approval 
addresses a dichotomous outcome based on the regulatory decision, while a disclosure 
about cyber-security risk might warn of detrimental impact to a firm’s public image. To 
investigate to what extent the conclusions of predictive ability of risk factors generalizes 
to the various different risks being disclosed, I use textual analysis techniques to classify 
individual risk factor disclosures. 
To classify risk factor disclosures and determine to what risks they pertain, I 
use the latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) technique to discover and extract the most 
prominent topics. The approach of using LDA to model topics in textual datasets 
originated with Blei, Ng, and Jordan (2003). Blei et al. (2003) describes a generative 
probabilistic model in which documents are composed of a distribution of topics, which 
themselves are composed of a distribution over the underlying words. The underlying 
idea is that different topics have a linguistic ‘fingerprint’ corresponding to the words 
commonly used within the topic’s domain, and a document can be a mixture of topics. 
The corresponding plate model diagram of LDA is shown in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1 : Graphical plate diagram representation of smoothed LDA model 
Figure 4.1 shows a ‘plate’ diagram representation of the smoothed LDA model de- 
veloped by Blei et al. (2003). The boxes, or ‘plates’ represent the objects modeled 
in the generative LDA approach. In this diagram, the outer plate M represents the 
document level, and the inner plate N represents topics (i.e. distributions of words) 
within the documents.
α
β
z w N
M
θ
k
η
The model, as developed in Blei et al. (2003) and implemented in this study, 
assumes the corpus has M documents each containing N words,1 which come from 
a dictionary of V total ‘known’ words. The model has the following steps for each 
document. First, the distribution of topics, θ is chosen from a Dirichlet distribution 
over prior α . θ , a k -dimension vector, is effectively the true distribution of topics 
in the document, from which the generation of each word will sample. Second, the 
distribution of words conditional on the topic, β is chosen from a Dirichlet distribution 
over the prior η (a scalar).2 β , a k by V matrix, is the probability of a given word 
occurring in a given topic, essentially a look-up table for word occurrence probability 
conditional on the topic. Lastly, for each word i in the document, a random topic,
1N can be a random variable which is different for each document, but is independent of the other 
variables in the model, thus can be considered constant without loss of generality. 
2The initial model presented assumes that β is exogenous, but the smoothed version presented here 
smooths probabilities across all words in the corpus, including those not seen in training by assuming 
β itself is a random variable to be estimated.
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zi, is selected from the prior θ , and the word wi is selected conditional on this topic. 
This last step is what differentiates the LDA model from more traditional hierarchical 
Bayesian models, in that it chooses a topic for each word , instead of choosing a topic 
for each document . This feature allows for a document to comprise multiple topics, 
each with a ‘loading’ or weight in the document. This results in the joint distribution 
of latent topic and word loading, as well as observed topics and words: 
p ( θ , β , z , w | α , η ) = p ( θ | α ) p ( β | η ) 
N∏ 
n =1 
p ( zn | θ ) p ( wn | zn , β ) (4.1) 
To extract topics from a corpus, which in this study is the set of risk factor 
disclosures, the researcher must make some discretionary assumptions about k , α , and 
η . The primary choice is the assumption of how many topics contained in the corpus, 
k . This choice is one faced in many taxonomies, specifically how and where to draw 
divisions between groups. One example of this is the Risk Factor Landscape study 
from the IRRC Institute (Lukomnik, 2016), which classifies risk factor disclosures into 
17 categories. However their classification does not have any domain specific risks. To 
allow for the potential of domain specific topics to be extracted, I use 25 topics in my 
LDA analysis. 
Another discretionary choice to make in the extraction of textual topics is the 
definition of document. One approach might be to use the whole risk-factor section 
as the document. However this would require the algorithm to handle documents 
containing all the risk factor topics simultaneously, with the majority of differences 
potentially being domain specific. I take a more sparse approach, and define the 
document at the individual risk factor level. This allows for a more sparse topic 
mixture in each document, and potentially allows for more even mixtures of generic
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risks and domain-specific risks. For example competition is a ubiquitous risk factor, 
but each industry may discuss it differently, potentially as some mixture between a 
domain topic and the competition topic. 
To estimate the LDA parameters, I use the publicly available gensim software.3 I 
scale the bag-of-word vectors by the inverse-document frequency, a method developed 
by Salton and McGill (1986) commonly adopted and referred to as tf-idf (term- 
frequency inverse document-frequency: word count / number of documents containing 
the word). I also remove those words which appear in more than half of the risk 
factors (eliminating frequent words like and, the, etc.), and words occurring in fewer 
than 200 risk factors, resulting in a final dictionary containing 6,950 words. I use 
priors for α and η empirically based on the data, and perform multiple passes over the 
corpus. The result of this analysis are displayed in Appendix C, along with a ‘name’ 
of the topic based on researcher judgment from the list of most frequent words.4 
I classify risk factors a pertaining to only one topic, namely that with the highest 
posterior probability. This may obfuscate the presence of a more weakly discussed risk 
factor, but it is more consistent with my undergirding assumption in this study that 
individual risk factor disclosures pertain to specific adverse outcomes, for which one 
topic plausibly applies. I then compute the same measures of risk factor disclosures, 
(new, removed, and maintained) for each LDA topic. Table 4.1 presents the average 
percentage of a firm’s disclosed risk factors for each topic, over time. There are some 
patterns in the distribution of risk factors over topics which evolve over time. For 
example the Financing topic, which discusses equity and real-estate related risks, 
significantly increases during the financial crisis in 2008. However other factors, for
3Available at github.com/RaRe-Technologies/gensim 
4The name of the topic is for referential convenience, and has no bearing on the analysis.
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example the oil price crashes of 2008 and 2014 are not reflected in a material change 
in the level of discussion of these risks. 
Table 4.1 : Portion of Total Risk Factors by Topic Across Time 
Table 4.1 reports the average percentage of risk factors a firm has in a given topic, by fiscal year. 
Topics are described in Appendix C.
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
H eal thcar e 11.31 11.85 12.11 13.52 13.81 14.12 14.51 15.10 15.41 15.70 
E ner g y 19.26 19.30 18.86 18.85 18.92 18.85 18.65 18.11 18.25 18.03 
D r ug s 17.65 17.64 17.13 16.51 16.33 16.51 16.15 16.08 15.95 15.60 
P er sonnel 10.27 10.27 10.20 9.62 9.29 9.18 9.03 9.04 8.83 8.67 
R etail 4.90 4.82 4.65 4.35 4.26 4.22 4.18 4.07 4.01 3.93 
I nf or mationT echnol og y 2.65 2.54 2.51 2.24 2.12 2.12 2.06 2.00 2.03 1.98 
C l aims/S ecur ity 1.17 1.18 1.19 1.00 0.93 0.96 0.93 0.94 0.98 0.99 
E nv ir on./R eg ul ate. 0.74 0.76 0.81 0.74 0.73 0.74 0.76 0.79 0.80 0.89 
I nter nat. I nv est. 0.34 0.32 0.29 0.28 0.32 0.30 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.34 
Accounting 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.27 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.27 0.27 
D ebt 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.31 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.29 0.28 0.30 
C ustomer s 0.31 0.34 0.38 0.42 0.43 0.42 0.45 0.49 0.51 0.56 
F inancing 0.20 0.24 0.26 0.43 0.47 0.48 0.50 0.51 0.47 0.49 
H edg ing 0.59 0.68 0.75 0.83 0.84 0.89 0.91 0.97 0.99 1.00 
I P 0.25 0.29 0.31 0.30 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.35 0.40 0.38 
I nter nal C ontr ol 0.26 0.29 0.31 0.29 0.30 0.31 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.36 
S tock M ar k et 0.49 0.55 0.58 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.56 0.60 0.71 0.70 
S tr ateg icAl l iance 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.20 
C ompetition 0.00 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.12 
E q uity /D iv idends 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 
Gov er nance 0.97 1.06 1.12 1.11 1.10 1.22 1.20 1.20 1.17 1.16 
E q uity Listing 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.08 
D r ug s ( Gener ic ) 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 
S uppl ier 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.20 0.23 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.21
Observations 2,440 3,189 3,326 3,444 3,424 3,264 3,221 3,261 3,203 3,154
The intent of focusing on individual risk factor topics is to lend robustness to the 
conclusion that firms disclose risk factors to predict adverse outcomes. The tests have 
focused on firm-specific adverse outcomes, based on the argument that a sufficiently 
adverse event could detrimentally impact the operations of the firm and result in a the 
bottom line outcomes I focus on (net loss, etc.). One benefit of focusing on the bottom 
line is that researcher discretion is not required to relate specific risk disclosures to 
their appropriate firm accounts. Such discretionary decisions are required, however, 
when studying the risk topics being disclosed, because the channel through which the
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disclosure forecasts an event becomes specific to the risk disclosure topic. For example 
a risk factor disclosure under the topic Competition could pertain to reduced revenue 
stemming from increased price competition, or it could pertain to a reduced profit 
margin stemming from increased upstream prices. Linking the topic of disclosure to 
firm-specific accounts is potentially confounded by the idiosyncratic nature by which 
a topic may relate to the firm. 
One firm-level adverse outcome which is plausibly related to an extracted topic is 
the presence of a goodwill impairment. Since the introduction of SFAS 142 in 2001, 
firm’s goodwill has to undergo a yearly impairment test.5 Failing this test can be 
significantly detrimental to the firm’s net income, thus early warning of potential 
impairments could provide legal benefit to managers. Hayn and Hughes (2006) suggests 
that the economic indicators of goodwill impairment lead the accounting write-off, 
sometimes by multiple years. This suggests that managers may reasonably predict the 
presence or probability of future adverse impairment test outcomes. This potential 
for predictability of goodwill impairments presents an interesting setting in which I 
can test whether managers do systematically warn of these adverse events through 
the risk factor disclosures, and specifically those topics pertaining to goodwill and 
impairments: Strategic Alliance and Accounting . The results of these tests, mirroring 
those performed in Table 2.4, are presented in Table 4.2. 
The results in Table 4.2 suggest that firms increase their disclosure of risks relating 
to Strategic Alliance (e.g. M&A activity) in advance of a goodwill write-off However 
there is not significant evidence of an increase in the discussion of Accounting terms, 
which includes goodwill and impairments. Given the findings in Hayn and Hughes 
(2006) that economic indicators of goodwill impairments precede the observed write-off
5See www.fasb.org/summary/stsum142.shtml.
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Table 4.2 : Risk Factors and Future Goodwill Impairments 
Table 4.2 reports the average marginal effects from a regression of the presence of a goodwill 
impairment on risk factor disclosures under the Strategic Alliance ( SA ) and Accounting topics. The 
topics are described in Appendix C. The sample omits repeated goodwill impairment observations, 
similar to the filter in Table 2.6. The Log (∆# S A ) and Log (∆# Acct. ) coefficients are calculated 
as the log of one plus the difference in new and removed risk factor disclosures of the respective 
topics, less the minimum difference to maintain a positive value in the logarithm function. The 
controls included are those used in Table 2.4: Log(Market Equity) , Big N , Book-to-Market , Tangibility , 
Leverage , Share Turnover , Beta , and Excess Returns , Standard Deviation , and Skewness . The 
variables are defined in Appendix ?? . Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and 
absolute t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 
and 0.10 level, respectively.
Goodwill Impairment Goodwill Impairment Goodwill Impairment 
(1) (2) (3)
Log (# N ew R F )t 0 . 025∗∗∗ 
(6 . 92) 
Log (# N ew S A )t 0 . 074∗∗ 
(2 . 16) 
Log (# N ew Acct. )t 0 . 031 
(1 . 07) 
Log (∆# S A ) 0 . 072∗∗ 
(2 . 08) 
Log (∆# Acct. ) 0 . 036 
(1 . 17) 
Log (# D r opped R F )t − 0 . 024∗∗∗ 
(6 . 14) 
Log (# D r opped S A )t − 0 . 050 
(0 . 95) 
Log (# D r opped Acct. )t − 0 . 029 
(0 . 82) 
Log (# R F )t − 1 0 . 108∗∗∗ 
(7 . 59) 
Log (# S A )t − 1 0 . 014 0 . 003 
(0 . 52) (0 . 12) 
Log (# Acct. )t − 1 0 . 026 0 . 021 
(1 . 37) (1 . 18)
C ontr ol s Y Y Y 
Y ear F .E . Y Y Y 
C or r el ated R .E . Y Y Y 
# Observations 21,969 21,617 21,617
by multiple years, it may be the case that firms disclose of goodwill impairments more 
than one year in advance. To test this, in untabulated results, I add a second lag of the 
accounting topic disclosures, and find a significant positive relationship (T-stat=2.19), 
suggesting managers potentially warn of impending impairments further in advance.
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To further provide suggestive evidence that managers warn of adverse outcomes, I 
test whether managers forecast macro level outcomes. Specifically, I focus the price of 
oil as proxy for a potentially significant adverse outcomes. Because many industries 
are affected by the price of oil, the expected cost of significant shifts in the price of oil 
may be sufficient to warrant a risk factor disclosure. Testing the disclosure of risks 
relating to the Energy topic against future changes in the price of oil lends evidence 
as to whether managers are incorporating their expectations about future outcomes 
in their disclosure decisions. The tests of the change of oil price on risk factors are 
presented in Table 4.3.6 
The results in Table 4.3 suggest that on average, firms disclose more overall risk 
factors in advance of relative oil price declines.7 This relation also exists for the 
Energy topic, suggesting firms disclose more risk factors specifically about energy 
topics in advance of price declines. Similarly, firms remove more risk factors in advance 
of subsequent oil price increases, consistent with managers ‘informatively’ updating 
their set of disclosed risk factors by actively removing obsolete risk factor disclosures. 
The net increase in the disclosure of risk factors relating to the Energy topic is also 
negatively associated with oil price changes, suggesting firms disclose overall more 
disclosure about energy related risk factors ahead of price declines.8 
In general, the results of robustness tests conducted on the individual topic level 
are somewhat mixed. Some of the results are consistent with expectations linking 
topic to outcome, for example Goodwill and Oil prices. However in untabulated
6The oil price is measured using the end of month spot price for West Texas Intermediate (WTI), 
a common benchmark for oil pricing. Data are downloaded from the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration. Url: www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet pri spt s1 d.htm. 
7Given the nature of a fixed effect regression, declines are relative to the average change in oil price. 
8These results include the measures used in Table 2.4 to control for ex-ante expected changes in the 
risk factors, but are robust to the exclusion of these controls, with the exception of the coefficient 
on new Energy risk factor disclosures becoming insignificant in Specification (2).
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Table 4.3 : Risk Factors and Future Oil Price 
Table 4.3 reports the results of a regression of the change in oil price on risk factor disclosures 
under the Energy topic. The topic is described in Appendix C. ∆ O il P r ice is measured as the 
difference between the monthly price of oil 3 months after the fiscal year end, less the price of oil at 
the fiscal year end. The controls included are those used in Table 2.4: Log(Market Equity) , Big N , 
Book-to-Market , Tangibility , Leverage , Share Turnover , Beta , and Excess Returns , Standard Deviation , 
and Skewness . The variables are defined in Appendix ?? . Robust standard errors are clustered at the 
firm level and absolute t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 
the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively.
∆ O il P r ice ∆ O il P r ice ∆ O il P r ice
(1) (2) (3)
Log (# N ew R F )t − 0 . 634∗∗∗ 
(5 . 68) 
Log (# N ew E ner g y )t − 0 . 349∗∗ 
(2 . 18) 
Log (∆# E ner g y ) − 0 . 914∗∗∗ 
(2 . 88) 
Log (# D r opped R F )t 0 . 769∗∗∗ 
(6 . 00) 
Log (# D r opped E ner g y )t 0 . 425∗∗ 
(2 . 21) 
Log (# R F )t − 1 − 5 . 448∗∗∗ 
(16 . 52) 
Log (# E ner g y )t − 1 − 1 . 701∗∗∗ − 1 . 690∗∗∗ 
(7 . 63) (7 . 63)
C ontr ol s Y Y Y 
F ir m F .E . Y Y Y 
# Observations 25,445 25,044 25,044
results, replacing the aggregated risk factor measures in Table 2.3 with the topic- 
level measures results in only a subset of topics being significantly predictive. This 
may suggest that only some topics have systematic relationships with the adverse 
outcomes I test in this study. An alternative interpretation is that some topics are less 
informative of short-term cash-flow outcomes, and the predictive framework employed 
herein is inflexible in accounting for differing horizons of forecasting. While future 
research looking at predictability by topic might find that specific subsets of risk factor 
disclosures are more predictive of specific outcomes, it could also be the case that 
aggregate change in risk factors is a more informative measure because it provides 
a more complete picture of managers assessed (and disclosed) beliefs. However the
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evidence presented herein suggests that both the aggregate and individual topic level 
risk factors are disclosed in a manner consistent with the hypothesis that managers 
disclose individual risk factors to warn of specific adverse outcomes.
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— Chapter 5 — 
Conclusion 
This study addresses the question of whether risk factor disclosures are informative 
by reconsidering both the measure used to capture the risk factors, and the test 
employed to determine ‘informativeness.’ My results suggest managers do disclose 
timely and definitive risk factors to warn of adverse outcomes, in accordance with the 
regulatory requirement. I find that the addition and removal of risk factors predicts 
future adverse economic outcomes even after controlling for ex-ante risk and firm 
performance, and that my measure of risk factors provides superior predictive ability 
over a popular measure used in extant literature. My approach differs from previous 
literature in that researchers have typically aggregated the risk disclosure using a bag 
of words approach, and primarily focused on market outcomes. My results suggest 
that treating risk factors as distinct units may be a more faithful representation of 
the information being conveyed by managers. 
Given the validation of this time-series approach to measuring the information 
in risk factors, I use my approach study the demand for these disclosures from two 
significant sources: investors and regulators. I focus on demand ‘shocks’ through 
public enforcement via SEC comment letters, and private enforcement from investors 
via securities litigation. Consistent with my predictions, I find that firms respond to 
private enforcement by expanding the set of risk factors they identify, but surprisingly 
do not increase the definitiveness of those disclosures. In contrast, I find firms respond 
to public enforcement not by increasing their identified risk factors as suggested in 
previous literature, but by improving their level of specificity and detail. In line with
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the cost benefit tradeoff to managers, I find that the response to private enforcement 
actions persists for multiple years, while public enforcement actions generally only 
effect changes in the subsequent filing. Together, these results shed light on the beliefs 
of managers as to the demand for risk factors disclosures from both regulators and 
investors. These results suggest that managers believe risk factor disclosures to be 
effective litigation shields for investors, and I provide evidence consistent with this 
belief. 
My study offers three main takeaways. First, my paper suggest that the SEC 
effectively elicits more detail in disclosures. While this may lead to conclusions in other 
studies that the length of disclosure is less correlated with underlying economic activity, 
my findings suggest that this focus on length may be falsely attributing regulatory 
impact to less informative disclosures. Additionally, my results point to an interesting 
role that risk factor disclosures may play as litigation shields, potentially substituting 
for voluntary information when the cost of the latter increases. Second, this study 
demonstrates that managers update their disclosures in a timely fashion, suggesting 
that they are not merely ‘copy and pasting.’ I find that firms are informatively choosing 
when to add and, importantly, remove information, and actively supply disclosure 
to meet information demand. These results suggest caution against interpreting the 
increasing length of disclosure as a sufficient signal of information overload; in some 
cases, a more targeted measure of information may be warranted. Last, my study 
demonstrate the potential value of considering the time series evolution of disclosures, 
and carefully constructing textual measures based on the data generating process 
underlying the disclosure.
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— Appendix A — 
Variable Descriptions 
The following table defines the variables used in this paper. Variable names and 
calculations provided in brackets correspond to source database. For the regressions 
presented in the tables, the continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles.
Variable Description
Assets Total assets { AT } 
Market Equity Market value of equity at fiscal year end. { C S H P R I ∗ P R C C F } 
Net Income/AT Net income to lagged assets. { N It /AT t − 1 } 
ROA Return on assets. { I Bt /AT t − 1 } 
Operating Inc./AT Operating income (after depreciation) to lagged assets. 
{ O I AD Pt /AT t − 1 } 
Sales Growth Ratio of change in sales to lagged assets. 
{ ( S ALEt − S ALEt − 1) /AT t − 1 } 
Sales / AT Sales to lagged assets. { S ALEt /AT t − 1 } 
Book Equity Book value of equity. { ( T E Qt | ATt − LTt) + T X D I T Ct − P S T Kt } 
Book-to-Market Book to market. { Book Equityt / Market Equityt } 
Leverage Leverage { ( D LT Tt + D LCt) /AT t } 
Tangibility Tangibility { P P E N Tt /AT t } 
Turnover Ratio of average daily volume (CRSP) to outstanding shares at fiscal 
year end (Compustat). 
Beta Market loading from CAPM model of daily returns on value weighted 
index, for all available days in the fiscal year. 
{ R E T = α + β · V W R E T D +  } 
Excess Returns Cumulative excess daily returns during fiscal year. 
{ (∏ R E T − V W R E T D + 1) − 1 } 
Excess Ret. Std. Standard deviation of daily excess returns. 
{ S td. D ev ( R E T − V W R E T D ) } 
Min. Excess Ret. Minimum daily excess return during fiscal year. 
{ M in ( R E T − V W R E T D ) } 
Excess Ret. Skew Skewness of daily excess returns. { S k ew ( R E T − V W R E T D ) }
Continued on next page...
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Variable Description
CAR+3 day Cumulative abnormal return spanning three business days starting on 
the filing date of the annual report, using a Fama-French Carhart 
factor model. Data from Kenneth French’s website. 
{ R E T = M K T R F + S M B + H M L + U M D + M O M +  } 
CAR+3 months Cumulative abnormal return spanning 60 business days starting on 
the filing date of the annual report, using a Fama-French Carhart 
factor model. Data from Kenneth French’s website. 
{ R E T = M K T R F + S M B + H M L + U M D + M O M +  } 
Bid-Ask Spread+1 y ear Average daily bid ask spread at closing for 240 business days starting 
on the filing date of the annual report, as percentage of average bid 
and ask. { 200 ∗ ( AS K − B I D ) / ( AS K + B I D ) } 
Illiquidity Amihud Illiquidity (2002), calculated as 1Diy 
∑Diy 
t =1 | Riy d | /V ol umeiy d, 
where Diy is the number of days over which the illiquidity is 
calculated, and Riy d and V ol umeiy d are the return and trading 
volume, respectively, on a given day. 
Negative NI Indicator variable equal to 1 if next year’s net income is negative. 
{ N It +1 < 0 } 
Negative Op. Inc. Indicator variable equal to 1 if next year’s operating income is 
negative { O I AD Pt +1 < 0 } 
Sales Decline Indicator variable equal to 1 if next year’s sales are lower than the 
current year’s sales by 10% or 10 million dollars, whichever is larger. 
{ S ALEt +1 − S ALEt < − 10% ∗ max (100 , S ALEt) } 
Security Litigation Indicator variable equal to 1 if a securities litigation is filed in the 
subsequent year. 
Lawsuit Intensity Natural log of number of litigation events found in CapitalIQ Key 
Developments database in a given fiscal year. 
RF Comment Indicator variable equal to 1 if an SEC comment letter is received in a 
given fiscal year that references risk factors. 
Comment (Any) Indicator variable equal to 1 if any SEC comment letter is received in 
a given fiscal year, including those with a reference to risk factors. 
FPS Industry Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has an SIC code in one of the 
high litigation risk industries defined in Francis et al. (1994). 
# Risk Factors Total number of risk factors disclosed under Item 1A of an annual 
report. 
# New RF Number of new risk factors which were not present in the previous 
year’s annual report. 
# Dropped RF Number of risk factors which were in the previous year’s annual 
report, but are no longer included in the present year. 
# Kept RF Number of risk factors which were in the previous year’s annual report 
and persist in the current annual report.
Continued on next page...
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Variable Description
∆ # RF Net change in the number of risk factors, equal to # New RF - # 
Dropped RF . 
# of Words Total number of words in Item 1A of an annual report (excluding stop 
words). 
# of Sentences Total number of sentences in Item 1A of an annual report. 
# of Specific Words Total number of words identified by the Stanford Named Entity 
Recognition algorithm as being in categories: Location, Person, 
Organization 
# of Numerics Total number of numbers in Item 1A of an annual report. 
# of Words/RF Ratio of the total number of words to the total number of risk factors 
in Item 1A of an annual report (excluding stop words). 
Specificity Ratio of the total number of specific words to the total number of risk 
factors in Item 1A of an annual report (excluding stop words). 
Numeric Intensity Ratio of the total number of numbers to the total number of risk 
factors in Item 1A of an annual report (excluding stop words). 
FOG Index Gunning Fog score for the text in Item 1A of an annual report 
(excluding stop words). Calculated as{ 
0 . 4 
( 
# of w or ds
# of sentences + 100
# of compl ex w or ds
# of w or ds 
)}
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Risk Factor Extraction 
To derive an initial list of filings, I extract the gvkey and historical CIKs from the 
Compustat annual file, starting from 89,687 firm years. I then merge the non-missing 
CIKs from Compustat with the EDGAR filings index file provided by the SEC.1 I 
filter the index files to include only form 10-Ks, excluding amended 10-K/As, leaving 
67,648 filings from 9,632 firms. Form 10-KSB is also included, but are no longer filed 
after 2009. 
I then search through these filings to extract Item 1A: Risk Factor section. Filings, 
as they are submitted to the EDGAR system, comprise an SGML header (with 
information about the filing such as company identifier, name, SIC code, and period 
with which the filing is associated), and multiple ‘documents’ that are typically 
the main form and exhibits. I extract the first document in a filing, which is the 
10-K report, but ignore the accompanying exhibits. This potentially biases against 
extracting the risk factor section if it is included in Exhibit 13, but is in line with the 
other studies of risk factors that omit sections included by reference. Similar to the 
approach in Campbell et al. (2014), I extract sections by assuming visual prominence 
of Item headings through font and whitespace delineation. Thus, I also exclude filings 
that are not submitted in HTML format because they omit the visual features required 
to reliably identify the sections in annual reports.
1Located, for example, at ftp.sec.gov/edgar/full-index/2005/QTR1/master.idx. Downloaded using 
script from github.com/gaulinmp/pyedgar
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The general algorithm I use for extracting a specific section in an annual or 
quarterly report is as follows. First, I identify the Item headings, which should occur 
in order throughout the document (omitting them when they occur in the table of 
contents, whether it is at the beginning or end of the document). I identify headings 
as being the only text on a ‘line’ of text, in the format Item 1A: Risk Factors (with 
flexibility in punctuation), and emphasized with either bold or underlined font. Once 
I identify Item 1A and either Item 1B or Item 2 (whichever is found and comes first), 
I extract the text between the first instance of Item 1A to first instance of the next 
non 1A Item header. Some firms repeat the Item 1A header at the top of each page 
of the section, thus I include all the text until the next item number. 
This method is based on visual identification of features that stand out to a human 
reader of the rendered document. The HTML format of annual reports allows for 
programatic identification of visual elements through the Document Object Model, or 
DOM. HTML DOM is a platform independent graph based method for describing 
content, primarily textual, in the case of HTML (but also arbitrary data in XML, one 
example of which being XBRL). Each element in a page is a node in the DOM graph, 
with parents that fully contain it, and potentially children it fully contains. Nodes in 
the graph, called HTML tags, have multiple types that each have different features. 
For example, the paragraph tag <p> defines a paragraph which is separated/isolated 
visually from text above and below (children nodes or parent nodes), while the font 
tag <font> defines a subset of words (potentialy children of a parent paragraph tag) 
that have a specific font, but are not isolated with whitespace from the surrounding 
text. These features of the different tag types allow for a researcher to programatically 
extract data based on what a human reader sees as whitespace or emphasis when 
viewing the rendered document in a web browser. Specifically, I use the beautifulsoup
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library to handle the HTML DOM which allows for traversing tag nodes in a graph-like 
format. 
For each HTML annual report, I iterate through all instance of an HTML tag 
containing the text Item 1A , 1B , or 2 , using the case insensitive regular expression 
( item(?:[^ a-z0-9]|&nbsp;)*(1[AB]|2) ). The &nbsp; is an HTML encoded rep- 
resentation of a non-breaking space, which is necessary to include when searching 
through raw HTML encoded documents. By only searching for Items 1A, 1B, and 
2, I impose the assumption that items are presented in order. The result of this 
search is then checked for emphasis, based on either HTML emphasis tags or CSS 
styles.2 Those items that are emphasized are then checked for whitespace separation. 
Whitespace separation is defined as the tag being at the beginning of a visual line, or 
as described in Campbell et al. (2014) as segmentation. 
To identify whitespace separation, I iterate up the HTML DOM to find the first 
parent node that is visually separated. This includes the tags: h1 , h2 , h3 , h4 , h5 , h6 , 
p , div , ul , ol , tr , or table . While it is possible that div tags are not visually isolated 
(using float CSS styling), in a non-exaustive search of HTML documents I did not 
find any instances of floats. Additionally, while some documents use paragraphs and 
CSS as mentioned above to lay out their annual report, other filings employ tables 
to do so. The difference is akin to using tab-stops in Microsoft word to put text 
on both the left and right side of a document, or alternatively creating a table with 
two columns. For firms that use the latter table method, merely checking within the 
immediate parent table cell may result in false conclusions as to the visual layout. 
Therefore, when an item is included in a table, I include the entire row as the parent
2HTML emphasis tags: b, em, strong, h1, h2, h3, h4, h5, h6, u. CSS Styles bold or underline within 
HTML tags: p, font, div, span, li.
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element, rather than just the cell. This separating parent element thus contains the 
‘block’ of text in which the word Item occurs and is emphasized, be it just the header 
Item 1A: Risk Factors , or a paragraph containing a reference to the Item 1A section. 
To filter out the latter false positives (including table of contents matches), I require 
that the full (plain) text in the separating element comprise solely the Item number 
and description using regular expressions.3 
The result of this step is the elements containing the Item headers for 1A, and 
1B or 2. I then keep all of the HTML code between the beginning of the first Item 
1A header and the beginning of the first Item 1B or 2 header, whichever occurs first. 
These extracted sections represent the Item 1A for each given filing. To match the 
filings to their associated Compustat fiscal years, I extract the period assigned with the 
filing from the heading of the EDGAR document. To do so, I search in the first 5,000 
bytes of the SGML header provided in the raw daily feed file for the PERIOD header. 
I keep the filing if the PERIOD header contains a string which conforms to an eight 
character date format (YYYYMMDD). I match the EDGAR filings to the Compustat 
data based on CIK (exact match) and period date (within a date window). I require 
the period listed in the filing header be within five business days of the datadate 
variable in Compustat. While greater than 90% of the filings have an exact match 
between the reported period and datadate , there are some discrepancies because 
Compustat always sets the datadate variable equal to the last day of a month. To 
verify this assumption, I manually selected a random sample of 50 reports with a date 
match 5 days apart, and found that all were matched to the appropriate fiscal year in 
Compustat.
3Item 1A: / ^  \ s*item[^a-z0-9]*1A[^a-z]*risk[^a-z]*factors? \ s*$ /, 
Item 1B: / ^  \ s*item[^a-z0-9]*1B[^a-z]*((?:unresolved|sec|staff|comments)[^a-z]*)+$ /, 
Item 2: / ^  \ s*item[^a-z0-9]*2. { ,20 } propert(y|ies) \ D { ,35 } $ /
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Extracted LDA Topics 
This appendix presents 24 topics extracted from the risk factor disclosures, along 
with the 20 most heavily weighted words in each topic. The LDA was calibrated on 
25 topics, but I omit the ‘preamble’ topic, which consists of general legal language 
pertaining to the PSLRA safe harbor disclaimer. Topics are presented in order of 
their weight in the corpus of risk factor disclosures.
Topic Name Top Weighted Words
Health/Pension healthcare, care, insurance, medicare, health, federal, 
pension, reimbursement, services, agreement, its, certain, 
medicaid, government, programs, state, act, claims, 
legislation, tenants 
Energy gas, oil, natural, energy, drilling, production, properties, 
fuel, exploration, costs, weather, prices, construction, coal, 
reserves, mining, transportation, facilities, aircraft, 
equipment 
Drugs (Production) fda, products, product, clinical, drug, approval, regulatory, 
candidates, patients, trials, medical, drugs, reimbursement, 
approvals, manufacturing, approved, pharmaceutical, 
marketing, physicians, market 
Personnel personnel, key, retain, employees, attract, management, 
qualified, executive, growth, ability, senior, success, chief, 
officer, manage, team, skilled, officers, services, loss 
Retail products, stores, distributors, merchandise, retail, brand, 
restaurants, customers, brands, retailers, store, consumer, 
new, distribution, restaurant, food, product, channel, 
apparel, automotive
Continued on next page...
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Topic Name Top Weighted Words
Information Technology internet, services, content, gaming, advertising, software, 
wireless, products, online, mobile, digital, customers, 
network, fcc, television, solutions, media, video, satellite, 
users 
Claims/Security systems, liability, insurance, security, claims, product, 
products, data, customers, coverage, reputation, computer, 
damage, defects, software, errors, result, failures, technology, 
breaches 
Environmental/Regulation regulations, laws, environmental, subject, hazardous, 
federal, state, comply, compliance, government, costs, 
regulatory, regulation, materials, safety, substances, 
penalties, emissions, fines, local 
International Investment foreign, international, china, countries, political, prc, united, 
export, labor, states, economic, currency, products, chinese, 
instability, outside, laws, terrorist, including, import 
Accounting goodwill, impairment, losses, assets, million, intangible, net, 
value, estimates, assumptions, fair, history, profitability, 
accounting, lived, charges, carrying, profitable, significant, 
continue 
Debt debt, indebtedness, capital, credit, financing, covenants, 
cash, facility, notes, ability, terms, funds, raise, obligations, 
interest, subsidiaries, default, revolving, senior, available 
Customers customers, economic, products, conditions, quarter, 
spending, revenue, demand, revenues, clients, contracts, 
global, markets, consumer, customer, services, result, credit, 
orders, timing 
Financing loans, loan, estate, real, mortgage, interest, portfolio, 
investments, credit, deposits, investment, rates, market, 
bank, institutions, value, losses, borrowers, banks, 
conditions
Continued on next page...
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Topic Name Top Weighted Words
Hedging tax, currency, foreign, currencies, dollar, rates, reinsurance, 
exchange, rate, hedging, ratings, income, taxes, fluctuations, 
rating, hedge, dollars, denominated, jurisdictions, 
counterparties 
Intellectual Property (IP) intellectual, patent, patents, rights, property, proprietary, 
litigation, claims, products, protect, technology, 
infringement, license, third, parties, secrets, licenses, 
against, proceedings, trade 
Internal Control internal, reporting, controls, accounting, sarbanes, oxley, 
over, control, act, public, weaknesses, disclosure, rules, 
governance, section, standards, effective, management, 
procedures, required 
Stock Market stock, price, common, market, trading, analysts, 
fluctuations, volatile, volatility, announcements, volume, 
shares, companies, has, performance, class, unrelated, 
litigation, fluctuate, competitors 
Strategic Alliance acquisitions, acquired, acquisition, businesses, merger, 
integration, integrate, joint, benefits, strategic, integrating, 
realize, venture, technologies, successfully, acquire, 
management, anticipated, ventures, strategy 
Competition products, new, competitors, competitive, market, product, 
technologies, services, compete, competition, technological, 
develop, customers, development, industry, technology, 
resources, markets, greater, companies 
Equity/Dividends stock, common, shares, dividends, price, warrants, preferred, 
convertible, stockholders, market, series, conversion, notes, 
options, dividend, foreseeable, outstanding, pay, cash, 
holders 
Governance directors, stockholders, stock, board, provisions, 
stockholder, shares, common, control, voting, delaware, 
shareholders, incorporation, takeover, preferred, bylaws, 
certificate, approval, rights, interests
Continued on next page...
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Topic Name Top Weighted Words
Equity Listing reit, tax, unitholders, income, partnership, units, taxable, 
partner, distributions, stock, common, penny, nasdaq, irs, 
carryforwards, broker, qualify, listing, code, ownership 
Drugs (Clinical) clinical, candidates, trials, product, development, 
commercialization, drug, products, research, commercialize, 
trial, collaboration, collaborators, pharmaceutical, 
marketing, collaborative, collaborations, preclinical, 
candidate, regulatory 
Supplier products, manufacturing, customers, suppliers, components, 
materials, raw, supply, inventory, customer, manufacturers, 
production, product, manufacture, orders, supplier, 
capacity, third, demand, significant
